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LAW, POSTMODERNISM AND RESISTANCE: 
RETHINKING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
THE IRISH HUNGER STRIKE 
by 
Richard F. Devlin· 
In recent years legal scholars have drawn upon the insights of post­
modernism and decof!struction as methods for the interpretation of legal 
texts. In this article the author attempts to assess the work of Baudrillard, 
Derrida and Lyotard not merely as interpretative strategies but as potential 
socio-legal theories. In order to ground the analysis, the author locates the 
assessment in the context of the hunger strike by Irish prisoners in /981. 
Drawing on the insights of postmodernism and deconstruction the author 
proposes that the fast can be understood as the erruption of a pre-colonial 
juridical consciousness by means of which the prisoners, quite literally, 
embodied law. However, by highlighting the specifics of the hunger strike, 
the author cautions that an unmodified postmodernism may generate some 
significant hurdles for those who seek a progressive and empowering socio­
legal theory. 
La loi, le postmodernisme et la resistance: repenser la 
signification de la greve de la faim en Irlande 
Depuis quelqu'es annees, Les juristes ont utilise Les acquis du post­
modernisme et de la deconstruction comme des methodes pour interpreter 
des textes de Loi. Le present article tente d'evaluer Les idees de Baudrillard, 
de Derrida et de Lyotard, non seulement comme des strategies interpreta­
tives, mais aussi comme des theories socio-legates potentielles. Pour fonder 
son analyse, !'auteur replace son evaluation dans le contexte de la greve de 
la faim faire par des detenus irlandais en 1981. A la lumiere du post­
modernisme et de la deconstruction, !'auteur suggere que la greve peut etre 
comprise comme l'erruption d'une conscience juridique pre-coloniale au 
moyen de laquelle Les detenus ont litteralement incorpore la Loi. Toutefois, 
en soulignant /es traits distinctifs de la greve, it avertit qu 'un post­
modernisme non modifie peut creer des obstacles importants pour ceux qui 
y cherchent une theorie socio-legale progressive et liberatrice. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Dalhousie Law School. 
This article has benefitted enormously from the reflections of, and conversations with, 
Alexandra Z. Dobrowolsky. Many other friends, students and colleagues have also 
contributed. To acknowledge some, but not others, would be unfair. I am grateful to 
everyone who provided input, though I have been unable to respond to all of their 
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I. PREFACE: A CELTIC TRIPTYCH 
Panel One 
Imagine how you would feel to be !ocked up naked in solitary confinement, 
twenty four hours a day, and subjected to total deprivation of not only 
common, everyday things, but of basic human necessities, such as clothes, 
fresh air and exercise, the company of other human beings. 
In short, imagine being entombed, naked and alone, for a whole day. What 
would it be like for twenty torturous months? 
Now again, with this in mind, try and imagine what it would be like to be 
in this situation in surroundings that resemble a pigsty, and you are crouched 
naked upon the floor in a corner, freezing cold, amid the lingering stench of 
putrefying rubbish, with crawling, wriggling white maggots all around you, 
fat bloated flies pestering your naked body, the silence is nerve-racking, 
your mind in turmoil. 
You are sitting waiting on the Screws coming to your cell to drag you out 
to be forcibly bathed. You have heard and seen results of this from many of 
your comrades at mass. You know only too well what it means: the skin 
scrubbed from your body with heavy brushes. The Screws have told you that 
you are next. You wait all day, just thinking. Your mind is wrecked . ..  
Consider being in that frame of mind every day! Knowing in your mind that 
you're to be beaten nearly senseless, forcibly bathed, or held down to have 
your back passage examined or probed. These things are common facts of 
everyday H-Block life. 
It is inconceivable to try to imagine what an eighteen-year-old naked lad goes 
through when a dozen or so screws slaughter him with batons, boots, and punch­
es, while dragging him by the hair along a corridor, or when they squeeze his 
privates until he collapses, or throw scalding water around his naked body. It is 
also inconceivable for me to describe, let alone for you to imagine, our state of 
mind just waiting for this to happen. I can say that this physical and 
psychological torture has brought many men to the verge of insanity. 
Panel Two 
"And what will the British do with you when they find you?' 
'Shoot me.' 
Bobby Sands1 
Bakhtin lowered his voice respectfully, like a man suddenly advised that 
he is in a funeral parlour. 'You don't expect to live?' 
B. Sands, Skylark Sing Your Lonely Song (Dublin: Mercier, 1982) al 82-83 [hereinafter 
Skylark). 
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'I hope not to. Once the British shoot us they're done for.' 
'Are we to take it,' Wittgenstein asked haughtily, 'that you're intent on 
becoming a martyr?' 
'That's right.' 
Wittgenstein stared violently into his left cuff and clutched a chunk of hair 
with his right fist. 
'We Irish don't regard the condition as particularly unusual,' Connolly 
continued. 'There's an ancient tradition of hunger striking in this island. If a 
tenant was dispossessed of his cabin and land he might go and starve to death 
on his landlord's doorstep. '  
'Where I come from,' said Wittgenstein tartly, 'that's known as suicide.' 
Terry Eagleton2 
Panel Three 
"Will someone please tell me why they are on hunger strike? . . .  Is it to prove 
their virility?" 
Margaret Thatcher3 
II. INTRODUCTION 
The opening triptych, to the extent that it blurs the distinction between 
"fact" and "fiction", foreshadows the central aspiration of this essay: to 
comprehend the incomprehensible, to consider the juridical and philo­
sophical significance of the Irish hunger strike of 1981. I focus on this 
almost unreal, but tragically too real, "event" for several (closely connected) 
philosophical, political and personal reasons. First, on the basis of the 
representation that I offer in this article, the hunger strike provides an 
opportunity to reflect upon what is perhaps the most enduring and intract­
able question of social theory: the relationship between structure (necessity) 
and agency (freedom).4 Specifically, the hunger strike enables us to critically 
interrogate the aspirations and assumptions of an (English) colonial legal 
structure and the agentic resistance of the juridically colonized (Irish). 
The second reason for my interest is more political. There is a widespread 
assumption in contemporary society that the rule of law is "an unqualified 
human good."5 For example, popular culture, in movies such as In the Name 
of the Father,6 while not exactly portraying the English legal system in its 
best light, still reinforces a belief in the promise and potential of law. 
Underlying such popular representations of the experiences of the "Guild­
ford Four" is what might be called a "bad cop" theory of law. The basic idea 
2 T. Eagleton, Saints and Scholars 97 (London: Verso, I 987). 
3 D. Beresford, Ten Men Dead (New York: Atlanic Monthly Press, 1987) at 212. 
4 See e.g., P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. R. Nice (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977) at 72-95; A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society: 
Outline of The Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); 
R.M. Unger, Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987) [hereinafter Social Theory]. 
5 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975) at 266. 
6 Universal City Studio Inc., 1993. 
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is that while there may be some personal misconduct and improper political 
interferences, if one can only find a good lawyer and a virtuous appeal 
court, in the end, Justice and Law will prevail. In this essay, I draw upon the 
insights of another non-legal space - the interpretive vehicle of literary 
criticism - to discuss another engagement between British Law and Irish 
subjects which suggests a more pessimistic theory of law than that of the 
"bad cop." This theory interrogates the very idea of whether Law can be a 
cognate of Justice and suggests that it is more closely connected with 
conquest, colonization and exclusion: "a will to empire."7 
Third, and more personally, as I was a law student in Belfast at the time, the 
strike has been a key aspect of my formative context and thus a constitutive 
part of my identity. In particular, by bringing into sharp relief the relationship 
between law, domination, violence and death, the hunger strike has turned out 
to be a (not always conscious but pervasive) backdrop against which I have 
constructed both my political philosophy and my jurisprudence.8 As Marx 
reminds us, "social being ... determines consciousness."9 
I propose to tell this story in a dialect different from that which usually 
predominates in the mainstream discourses of the North Atlantic societies. 
More precisely, I will filter my interpretation through the insights of both 
postmodemism and deconstruction. 10 My purpose will be to consider the 
intersections between postmodemism/deconstruction11 and nationalism in 
order to inquire into the utility of such perspectives in helping to de-centre 
the hegemony of a dominant-British-legal discourse, and thereby to create 
space for fhe valorization of a marginalized and subordinated legal dis-
7 R.A. Williams Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of 
Conquest (Oxford: Oxford Univer$ity Press, 1990) at 8. Williams' work is more 
historical, whereas my project is more contemporary. Juridical imperialism has 
continuing resonances for the present. 
8 The primary focus of much of my scholarship over the last several years has been a 
negative critique of the relationship between law, state and violence in the self-satisfied 
western liberal democratic societies. See e.g., R.F. Devlin, "Nomos and Thanatos [Part 
BJ: Feminism as Jurisgenerative Transformation or Resistance Through Partial 
Incorporation?" ( 1990) 13 Dalhousie L.J. at 123; R.F. Devlin, "Nomos and Thanatos 
[Part A]: The Killing Fields: Modern Law and Legal Theory" ( 1989) 12 Dalhousie L.J. 
at 298; R.F. Devlin, "Law's Centaur: A Preliminary Theoretical Inquiry into the Nature 
and Relations of Law, State and Violence" ( 1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. at 219. In this 
essay, I seek to move beyond critique to reconstruction through the legitimization of 
anti-colonial juridical claims. 
9 K. Marx, Selected Writings, ed. by D. McLlenan (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
1985) at 389. 
IO For some this "dialogue" between post-modernism and republicanism may appear 
oxymoronic. But it is not unprecedented. For a very different take on post-modernism 
and Ireland, see J. Smyth, "Weasels in the Hole: Ideologies of the Irish Conflict" in Y. 
Alexander & A. O'Day, eds. , The Irish Terrorism Experience (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1991) at 138, 143-150. See also, J. Derrida's (cryptic) reference to "a hunger strike in 
prison" in "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundations of Authority"' ( 1990) 1 1  Cardozo 
L. Rev. 919 at 997 [hereinafter "Force"). 
Moreover, as one commentator points out, "many dialogues are set in prison (Plato's 
Phaedo, The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius or Sir Thomas More's A Dialogue 
of Comfort Against Tribulation)." T. Clark, Derrida, Heidigger Blanchot (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992) 18. 
1 1  I want to note at the outset that I quote quite extensively from the work of postmodern 
and deconstructive theorists because I have found that many commentators attribute 
positions and arguments to authors with little textual support. 
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course.12 One claim that I shall advance is that legal knowledge is itself a 
terrain of political struggle, and that dominant legal interpretations are only 
so because of their superior force, not because of their superior truth. 13 
Consequently, the British interpretation has no privileged access to the truth 
of the hunger strike. 14 In short, historical meaning is socially constituted, and 
so, as Oscar Wilde reminds us, "the one duty we owe history is to rewrite 
it. ,,15 
Although I shall argue that postmodemism and deconstruction enable us 
to think critically about power, knowledge, truth, history, self and language, 
this "case study" into I the relationship between ethnicity and law will, 
however, highlight some of the weaknesses of postmodemism and decon­
struction, and specifically their ability to "put the dissidents back into 
history." 16 In particular, I will suggest that the postmodern tendency to focus 
on texts and epistemology, while absolutely necessary, is insufficient and, 
therefore, needs to be supplemented by an emphasis on politics and ethics. 
An indirect 17 suggestion will be that those groups - and, in particular, those 
theorists - in North American society who embrace postmodernism in the 
pursuit of difference and inclusion are excessively discursive in their 
conception of power and, therefore, incapable of adequately supporting a 
sufficiently destabilizing practice. 18 My aim will be to walk the tightrope 
12 As this sent�nce makes clear, mine is a particular characterization of postmodernism and 
deconstruction that is designed to consider its relevance for politico-juridical inquiry. 
Some may find this characterization contestable but, I hope, not a caricature. 
13 As Norris notes, deconstruction can be understood as "a positive technique for making 
trouble; an affront to every normal and comfortable habit of thought", C. Norris, (rev. 
ed.) Deconstruction: Theory and Practice X (New York: Routledge, 1991). 
14 Said has adopted the methodology of deconstruction to demonstrate that "the West's" 
approach to cultural history is partisan and ethnocentric, non-objective and downright 
racist. E. Said, Orienta/ism (New York: Random House, 1978). This essay pursues 
roughly the same project in the sphere of legal colonialism, based in part on Said's 
ethico-discursive "right of formerly un- or mis-represented human groups to speak for 
and represent themselves in domains defined, politically and intellectually, as normally 
excluding them, usurping their signifying and representing functions, over-riding their 
informal reality". E. Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered", F. Baker et al, eds., Literature, 
Politics and Theo,y: Papers for the Essex Conference 1976-1984 (New York: Methuen, 
1986) at 212. 
I 5 Quoted in L. Hutcheon, ( I 988) The Poetics of Postmodemism 96. 
16 C. Douzinas et al., Postmodern Jurisprudence (London: Routledge, 1991) at 51. 
17 I say indirect because too often scholars are tempted to develop rather grand speculations 
on the basis of some rather minor studies. And this, I think, has been a particular vice 
for jurisprudents. My claim is that based upon the particular analysis offered in this 
essay, others might want to consider the relevance of my particular propositions for their 
particular interests. For a salutary critique of the academic tendency for "careless 
generalization", see G. Wickham, "The Political Possibilities of Postmodemism" (1990) 
I 9 Econ. and Soc 'y. 121. 
18 See e.g., A. Botwinick, Postmodernism and Democratic Theory (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1993) at 229-231; D. Cornell, "Institutionalization of Meaning, 
Recollective Imagination and the Potential for Transformative Legal Interpretation" 
(1988) 136 U.Penn. L. Rev. 1135; J. Handler, "Dependent People, The State and The 
Modern/Postmodern Search for Dialogic Community" ( 1986) 36 U.C.l.A. L. Rev. 999; 
A.C. Hutchinson, "Talking The Good Life: From Free Speech To Democratic Dialogue" 
(1989) I Yale J. L. & Lib. 17 (1989); F. Michaelman, "Law's Republic" (1989) 47 Yale 
L.J. 1493; F.J. Mootz III, "Postmodern Constitutionalism or Materialism" (1992) 91  
Mich. L.  Rev. 515. See also, R. Devlin, "Demanding Difference but Doubting Discourse" 
(1994) 7 C.J. W.l. 156. 
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between those who posit that postmodernism and deconstruction are pro­
foundly liberationist 1 9  and those who argue that it is dangerously 
conservative. 20 
The article is divided into four further sections. In Part III, by means of 
an introduction to certain works of Lyotard, Baudrillard and Derrida, I 
provide an overview of some of the key motifs of both postmodernism and 
deconstruction: otherness, pluralism, simulation, differance and incom­
mensurability. My purpose in this section is not to provide a definitive or 
comprehensive account of these theories but rather to sketch a basic 
topography that will gain sharper relief as the essay progresses. In Part IV, 
I apply some of these insights to the events surrounding the 1981 Hunger 
Strike by Irish prisoners in British jails in the North of Ireland. I advance 
the juridically impertinent proposition that what was at stake was not merely 
a politically strategic, last ditch act of desperation, but "(an)other" 
indigenously Irish legal claim based upon a subordinated legal culture, the 
Brehon laws.2 1 As Foucault reminds us, "an act of popular justice cannot 
achieve its full significance unless it is clarified politically ."22 Restated 
jurisprudentially, I will argue that the hunger strike can be conceived of as 
a "jurisgenerative" act23 through which the prisoners sought to embody law. 
In Part V, on the basis of this story, I will develop some reflections 
concerning the utility of postmodernism and deconstruction for others who 
aspire to 1:he legal recognition of difference. My aim will be to resist the 
tendency towards disengagement and political quietism which may be 
engendered by some aspects of postmodernism and deconstruction. Finally, 
Part VI will provide some (in)conclusive thoughts. 
19 See e.g., D. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction and the 
Law (New York: Routledge, 1991)  [hereinafter Beyond]; l. Hassan, The Postmodern 
Turn (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987); J.F. Lyotard, The Postmodern 
Condition XXV ( I  984) [hereinafter Condition]; N. Wakefield, Post-Modernism: The 
Twilight of the Real (London: Pluto Press, 1990); E. Laclau, "Politics and the Limits of 
Modernity", A. Ross ed., Universal Abandon: The Politics of Postmodernism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 63,. 79-80; C. Mouffe, "Radical 
Democracy or Liberal Democracy" ( 1990) 20(2) Socialist Rev. 57; J. Derrida, Of 
Grammatology, trans. G. Spivak, 1st American ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
·Press, I 976) at lxxvii [hereinafter Grammatology]. 
20 See e.g., A. Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1989); J. Ellis, Against Deconstruction (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989); G. Graff, Literature Against Itself: Literary Ideas in Modern Society 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); G. Binder, "Representing Nazism: 
Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie" (1989) 98 Yale L.J. I 321; T. 
Eagleton, "Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodemism" ( 1985) 152 New Left Rev. 60; 
J. Handler, "Postmodernism, Protest and the New Social Movements" ( 1992) 26 Law & 
Soc'y. Rev. 697; J. Habermas, "Modernity Versus Postmodernity" (1981) 22 New 
German Critique 3. 
21 For another recent attempt to analyse a marginalized legal culture, see W.O. Weyranch 
& M.A. Bell, "Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the Gypsies" (1993) 103 Yale L.J. 
323. 
22 M. Foucault, "On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists" in C. Gordon, ed. 
Power/Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, I 980) I at 3 1. 
23 R. Cover, "The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Forward, Nomos and Narrative" ( 1983) 97 
Harv. L. Rev. 4 at 16. 
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III. POSTMODERNISM AND DECONSTRUCTION 
There has been a proliferation of interest in the legal academy in recent 
years in the ideas of postmodemism and deconstruction. 24 However, most 
24 See e.g., A. Carty, Post-Modern Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990) 
[hereinafter Post-Modern Law]; D. Cornell, Philosophy of the Limit (New York: 
Routledge, 1992); C. Douzinas et al., Postmodern Jurisprudence (New York: Routledge, 
1991 ); Z. Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988); P. Fitzpatrick, Dangerous Supplements ( 1990); M.J. Frug, Postmodern 
Legal Feminism (New York: Routledge, 1992); P. Goodrich, Languages of Law (1991); 
M. Kramer, Legal Theory, Political Theory and Deconstruction (1991 ); D. Milovanovic, 
Postmodern Law and Disorder ( 1992); G. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism: Poststructuralism 
and Law (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984); C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law 
(New York: Routledge, 1989); A. Woodiwiss, Social Theory After Postmodernism: 
Rethinking Production, Law and Class (London: Pluto Press, 1990); M. Ashe, "Mind's 
Opportunity: Birthing a Post-Structuralist Feminist Jurisprudence" (I 987) 38 Syracuse 
L. Rev. 1129; M. Ashe, "Inventing Choreographies: Feminism and Deconstruction" 
( I 990) 90 Colom. L. Rev. 1123; A. Austin, "Deconstruction: The Road to a Derridean 
Cul-de-sac where 'There is no There There' and 'There is no About About for Anything 
to be About"' (1994) 12 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 181; J.M. Balkin, "What is a 
Postmodern Constitutionalism?" ( 1992) 90 Mich. L. Rev. I 966 [hereinafter "Postmodern 
Constitutionalism"]; J.M. Balkin, 'Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice" 
(1994) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 113 I ; J.M. Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory" 
( 1987) 96 Yale L.J. 758 [hereinafter "Deconstructive Practice"]; J. Boyle, "Is Subjectivity 
Possible? The Postmodern Subject in Legal Theory" ( I 991) 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 89; A. 
Carty & J. Mair, "Some Post-Modern Perspectives on Law and Society" (1990) 17 J. 
Law & Soc'y. 395; M. Clawson, "Prescription Adrift in A Sea of Servitudes : 
Postmodernism and The Lost Grant" (1994) 43 Duke L.J. 845; D. Cornell, "Toward a f 
Modern/PostmoJ;lem Reconstruction of Ethics" (1985) 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 291; D. 
Cornell, 'Time, Deconstruction, and the Challenge to Legal Positivism" (1990) 2 Yale 
J. L. & Humanities 267; C. Dalton, "An Essay on the Deconstruction of Contract 
Doctrine" ( 1985) 94 Yale L. J. 997; N. Duxbury, "Post-modern Jurisprudence and its 
Discontents" (1991) 11 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 589; M.J. Frug, "A Postmodern Feminist 
Legal Manifesto" (1992) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1045; E.F. Hartigan, "Derridoz Law Written 
in Our Heartland: 'Powers Retained by The People"' (1993) 67 Tu/. L. Rev. 133 (1993); 
A. Hunt, "Living Dangerously on the Deconstructive Edge" ( 1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
867; A. Hutchinson, "From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction" ( 1984) 
94 Yale L. J. 209; B. Johnson, "The Postmodern in Feminism" (1992) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 
1076; I. Landau, "Early and Late Deconstruction in the Writings of Jacques Derrida" 
(1993) 14 Cardozo L. Rev. I 895; J.W. Mohr, "From Saussure to Derrida: Margins of 
Law" (1983) 18 Queen 's L. 1. 43; C. Norris, "Law, Deconstruction and the Resistance 
to Theory" in R.C. Davis & R. Schleifer, eds. ,  Deconstruction and the Interests of 
Theory, vol. 4, Oklahoma Project for Discourse and Theory (London: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1989) 126; D. Patterson, "Feminism, Postmodern ism and Law" ( 1991-
1992) 77 Cornell L. Rev. 254; P. Rush, "Killing Me Softly With His Words: Hunting 
the Law Student" (1990) I Law and Critique 21; P.C. Schanck, "Understanding Post-
modern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation" (1992) 65 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 2505; P. Schlag, "Normative and Nowhere to Go" (1990) 43 Stan. L. Rev. I 67 
[hereinafter "Normative"]; P. Schlag, "Le hors de Texte C'est Moi" (1990) 1 1  Cardozo 
L. Rev. 1631 [hereinafter "Le Hors"]; P. Schlag, "The Problem of the Subject" (1991) 
69 Tex. L. Rev. 1627 [herein�fter "Subject"]; P. Schlag, "Normativity and the Politics 
of Form" (1991) 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 801; B. de S. Santos, "Law: A Map of Misreading: 
Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law" (1987) 14 J. L. & Soc'y 279; M. Schwanz 
& D. Friedricks, "Postmodern Thought and Criminological Discontent: New Metaphors 
for Understanding Violence" (1994) 32 Criminology 221; B. Tingle, "Redeeming the 
Promise of Our Laws" (1992) 30 Alta. L. Rev. 1324; I. Ward, "In Search of a European 
Identity" ( 1994) 57 Mod. L. Rev. 3 I 5. There have also been several symposia: "Decon­
struction and the Possibility of Justice" (1989) 1 1  Cardozo L. Rev. 9 I 9; "Necessity of 
Violence for Any Possibility of Justice" (1991) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1081; "The Politics 
of Postmodernism: The Presidential Address Symposium" (1992) 26 Law & Soc'y Rev. 
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approaches have tended to apply postmodern and deconstructive insights to 
legal "texts" such as constitutions, statutes, cases, government reports and 
politico-legal theory. The purpose of this essay is more ambitious: to 
interpret legal practices, legal institutions and legal structures through the 
grid of postmodernism and deconstruction, and to consider the adequacies 
of these modes of analysis not just as interpretive techniques, but also as 
potential juridico-social theories.25 Moreover, I propose to consider 
Derrida's recent claim that deconstruction is "revolutionary", that is, "to the 
extent that it assumes the right to contest, and not only theoretically, 
constitutional protocols . . .  the right to contest established law in its strongest 
authority, the law of the State."26 
Although postmodernism as political philosophy and deconstruction as 
critical method27 do not share an identity, there are certain elements of 
homology, continuity and overlap between them that are of interpretive 
value in the understanding of social phenomena. 
693; "Feminist Critical Legal Studies and Postmodern ism" ( 1992) 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 
1173; "Transfonnati ve Discourses in Postmodern Social, Cultural and Legal Theory" 
(1991) XV Legal Stud. Forum 279; P. Schlag, "Forward: Postmodernism and Law" 
(1991) 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 439. 
25 The ambition of this paper is influenced, in part, by Geertz's "interpretive anthropology", 
that is, the application of "hermeneutics" and "text" to "social action, to people's 
behaviour to other people". Prefacing his proposition with some appropriate cautions, 
Geertz po.§its: 
The key to the transition from text to text analogue, from writing as discourse to 
action as discourse, is ... the conception of "inscription": the fixation of meaning . ... 
The great virtue of the extension of the notion of text beyond things written on paper 
or carved into stone is that it trains attention on precisely this phenomenon: on how 
the inscription of action is brought about, what its vehicles are and how they work, 
and on what the fixation of meaning from the flow of events ... implies for socio­
logical interpretation. 
C. Geertz, Local Knowledge 5, (New York: Basic Books, 1983) at 3 1. 
Similarly, Derrida seems to aspire to such a project for deconstruction when, replying 
to two of his critics, he argues: 
But one thing at least I can tell you now: an hour's reading ... should suffice for you 
to realize that text, as I use the word, is not the book ... it is not limited to the paper 
which you cover with your graphism. It is precisely for strategic reasons ... that I 
found it necessary to recast the concept of text by generalizing it almost without limit, 
in any case without present or perceptible limit, without any limit that is. That's why 
there is nothing "beyond the text." That's why South Africa and apartheid are, like 
you and me part of this general text, which is not to say that it can be read the way 
one reads a book. That's why the text is always a field of forces . ... That's why 
deconstructive readings and writings are concerned not only with library books, with 
discourses, with conceptual and semantic contents. ... They are also effective ... 
interventions, in particular political and institutional interventions that transform 
contexts without limiting themselves to theoretical or constantive utterances . ... That's 
why I do not go "beyond the text," in this new sense of the word text, by fighting and 
calling for a fight against apartheid . ... [T]he strategic re-evaluation of the concept of 
text allows me to bring together in a more consistent fashion ... theoretico­
philosophical necessities with the "practical", political, and other necessities of what 
is called deconstruction. 
J. Derrida, "But, Beyond" (Open Letter to Anne McClintock and Rob Nixon) (1986) 13 
( I )  Critical Inquiry 155, 167-168. 
26 Derrida, "Force", supra note 10 at 995. 
27 C. Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (London/New York: Methuen, 1982) at 
31. 
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A. Postmodernism 
Postmodernism (with its implied and sometimes explicit cntique of 
"modemism"28) is currently getting much play in the academic world, 
usurping the traditional debate between the "ancients" and "moderns."29 
Given its complex and portmanteau character,30 postmodernism is 
notoriously difficult to get a handle on. This is because it spans a variety of 
cultural and academic fields,31 it has advocates who frequently adopt 
profoundly incompatible perspectives,32 it revels in its ephemeral, splintered 
and fractured dynamism and - as a result of its predilection for being 
"post" - is reluctant to construct any determinative or homogeneous self 
image. 33 Nevertheless, in spite of its slipperiness, I do think that it is 
possible to provide an account (though not a definition) of postmodernism 
in which a few common motif s34 stand out. 
First, there is the historical and spatial dimension.35 Although the term 
"postmodernism" first gained some currency in the 1 930s, 36 it seems to be very 
much a phenomenon of the late twentieth century North Atlantic society.37 
Bubbling under the surface in the l 940s and 1 950s, surfacing in the 1960s, 
28 For some quite helpful overviews of modernism see M. Bradbury & J. Macfarlane, eds., 
Modernism (New York: Penguin, 1976); A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); E. Lunn, Marxism and Modernism: An 
Historical Study of Lukacs, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno (Berkeley: University 
California Press, 1982). 
29 As one, not particularly sympathetic, commentator has pointed out, "In recent years 
(postmodernism) has determined the standards of debate, defined the manner of 
'discourse', and set parameters on cultural, political, and intellectual criticism", D. 
Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) at viii. 
30 See e.g., M. Rose, The Post-Modern and the Post-Industrial (199 l )  3-20. 
3 1  Featherstone identifies practitioners of postmodernism in music, art, fiction, film, 
photography, architecture, literary theory and criticism, philosophy, anthropology and 
geography. M. Featherstone, "Pursuit of the Postmodern" ( 1988) 5 Theory, Culture and 
Soc'y 195, 202. See also, S. Connor, Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories 
of the Contemporary (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989); R. Boyne & A. Rattansi, eds., 
Postmodernism and Society (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1990). 
32 Compare C. Jencks, What is Postmodemism? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989) with 
J.F. Lyotard, The Post-Modem Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984) [hereinafter Condition]. 
33 S.L. Winter, "For What It's Worth" (1992) 26 L. & Soc'y Rev. 789. 
34 Following A. Megill, The Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, 
Derrida (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) at 273 it may be more 
appropriate to talk of "motifs rather than themes" in that the former has stronger artistic 
and literary connotations and therefore may be closer to the postmodern mindframe. 
There may be a danger that the following may fall under the rubric of what Pierre 
Schlag, with characteristic aggressive wit, has called "postmodemism lite" [Forms 
unpublished manuscript 6]. In response, I would suggest that some of the more "classic" 
offerings have proved to be indigestible. As a result, and to switch the metaphor, the 
usual caveat applies: that the following is, of necessity, a very broad stroke of the brush. 
35 For further discussions of this dimension see F. Jameson's influential "Postmodernism, 
or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" ( 1984) 146 New Left Rev. 53 and the quite 
excellent Harvey, supra note 29. 
36 Featherstone, supra note 3 I at 202; A. Huyssen, "Mapping the Postmodern" (I 984) 33 
New German Critique 5. 
37 In this historical vein White argues that the "postmodern problematic" is "constituted by 
four phenomena: growing incredulity towards traditional metanarratives, new awareness 
of the costs of social rationalization, the explosion of informational technologies, and the 
emergence of new social movements", S. White, Political Theory and Postmodemism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 1-12. 
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surging in the 1970s and cresting, perhaps, in the 1980s, there appears to be a 
correlation between postmodernism and the shifting sensibilities of what 
Unger has called "the rich western democracies. "38 Specifically, it is suggested 
that due to the rapid changes induced by technology, de-industralization and 
mediazation,39 there have been crucial social shifts. This cultural moment is 
sometimes called "postmodemity" or "post-industrialism." 
Second, the prefix "post" though having an historical ring, also seems to 
introduce the essentially critical aspirations of the project, which is to say that 
it is easier to conceptualize what it is "against" - modernism and the false 
promises of enlightenment thought - than what it is "for." Furthermore, 
although some commentators see the "post" as signalling a complete break 
with "modernism", my understanding is that it is perhaps better to 
comprehend the relationship as one of a complicated but dependent critique 
of "modemism."40 Third, and bringing together these two ideas of the 
38 Social Theory, supra note 4 at 2. 
39 Balkin, "Postmodern Constitutionalism", supra note 24 at 1989. 
40 This, of course, begs the question of what we mean by "modernism." One particularly 
helpful schematization of the relationship between modernism and postmodernism is to 
·be found in the following parallel columns developed by Ihab Hassan. He draws on a 
variety of "fields" and "authors" including "rhetoric, linguistics, literary theory, 
philosophy, anthropology, psychoanalysis, political science, even theology": 
Modernism 
Romanticism/Symbolism 
Form (oonjunctive, closed) 
Purpose 
Design 
Hierarchy 
Mastery/Logos 
Art Object/Finished Work 
Distance 
Creationrrotalization 
Synthesis 
Presence 
Centering 
Genre/Boundary 
Semantics 
Paradigm 
Hypotaxis 
Metaphor 
Selection 
Root/Depth 
Interpretation/Reading 
Signified 
Lis ible (Reader! y) 
Narrative/Grande Histoire 
Master Code 
Symptom 
Type 
Genital/Phallic 
Paranoia 
Origin/Cause 
God the Father 
Metaphysics 
Determinacy 
Transcendence 
H 
Postmodern ism 
Pataphysics/Dadaism 
Antiform (disjunctive, open) 
Play 
Chance 
Anarchy 
Exhaustion/Silence 
Process/Performance/Happening 
Participation 
Decreation/Deconstruction 
Antithesis 
Absence 
Dispersal 
Text/lntertext 
Rhetoric 
Syntagm 
Parataxis 
Metonymy 
Combination 
Rhizome/Surface 
Agai nstl nterpretation/Misreadi ng 
Signifier 
Scriptible (Writerly) 
Anti-narrative/Petite Histoire 
Idiolect 
Desire 
Mutant 
Polymorphous/Androgynous 
Schizophrenia 
Difference-Differancerrrace 
The Holy Ghost 
Irony 
Indeterminacy 
Immanence 
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historical moment and the negation of modernity, there is the conception of 
"postmodernism" as a mindframe, one that reflects a sense of disenchantment 
and disillusionment with our current social and cultural practices and the 
dominant discourses that reflect, constitute and sustain them. More precisely, 
postmodernists reject the idea that things are necessarily getting better. They 
point to "the new forms of central bureaucracy, mediazation, suburbanization 
and surveillance"4 ' which result in a further pacification of the citizenry.42 
Moreover, they question whether the ambitions of modernity - and the cor­
relative faith in humanist universals suth as "mastery", "growth", "develop­
ment" and "progress" - are as desirable or sustainable as we might once 
have thought. Specifically, they highlight our stalled economies and inter­
rogate the price of our so called civilization.43 The concern seems to be that 
for all our "advancements", we have ended up with a culture of monotony, 
banality and sameness.44 
While the foregoing overview of the motifs of - "postmodemity" and 
"postmodemism" may be helpful in identifying both the context in which 
postmodernism has emerged and some of the broad propositions that are 
associated with it, it is (predictably) abstract and ambiguous. Of greater 
relevance to this essay are several philosophical propositions attributed to 
postmodernism. First, postmodernists challenge the idea that we can ever 
have an immediate interaction with, or conception of, "reality." They suggest 
that because our relationships with reality are always and already filtered -
and therefore socially mediated - knowledge is a (once removed) re­
presentation rather than an (automatic) experience. If this is so, then reality 
and knowledge must be understood as lacking an objective or non-contingent 
foundation and are therefore flimsy, fragmentary, unstable, heterogeneous 
and plural.45 In this light, "authenticity" and "reality" are re-encoded as 
"fabrication" and "simulation."46 Such an interpretive approach to knowledge 
Hassan, The Postmodern Turn, supra note 19 at 9 1-92. For further discussions of the 
contradictory relationship between modernism and postmodernism see L. Hutcheon, 
Poetics of Postmodemism, (1988); J. Keane, The Modern Democratic Revolution: 
Reflections on Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition in Judging Lyotard 81, 91, A. 
Benjamin, ed., (New York: Routledge, 1992); A. Wellmar, "On The Dialectic of 
Modernism/Postmodernism" (1985) 4 Pra,xis International 337. 
41 Balkin, "Postmodern Constitutionalism", supra note 24 at 1989. 
42 See e.g., J. Baudrillard, Selected Writings, M. Poster, ed., (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1988) [hereinafter Writings]; J. Baudrillard, In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities 
(New York: Semiotext(e), 1983) [hereinafter Shadow]; J. Baudrillard, Simulations (New 
York: Semiotext( e ), 1983) [hereinafter Simulations]. 
43 Baudrillard, "Consumer Society" in Writings, id. at 29. 
44 Supra note 29 at 8-9. 
45 S. Lash, Sociology of Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1990) at 15. 
46 Baudrillard argues in a famous passage that: 
The very definition of the real has become that which it is possible to give an 
equivalent reproduction . . . the real is not only that which is reproduced, but that 
which is already reproduced . . . the hyperreal. ... The hyperreal transcends 
representation only because it is entirely in simulation. 
Baudrillard, Simulations, supra note 42 at 146-147. 
Foucault has stated, that "[a] number of us, I think, including myself, consider that 
reality does not exist, that only language exists" in B. Cooper, Michel Foucault: An 
Introduction to the Study of his Thought (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1982) at 28. 
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is sometimes called "perspectivism"47 or "antifoundationalism"48 in that it 
posits that there can be a plurality of mutually incommensurable perspectives 
each offering equally valid interpretations of reality. Thus, in the historical 
sphere, it is argued that "every representation of the past has specifiable 
ideological implications."49 Postmodemism dismantles "Truth", at least with 
a capital "T."50 This epistemological revision of reality generates a 
postmodern embracement of "otherness" (a.k.a. alterity).5 1  
Secondly, postrriodemism is so radical in its disassembly and decomposi­
tion of conventional wisdom, it argues that the very idea of "the individual" 
or "the subject" is up for grabs. Having negated the possibility of unencoded 
representations, it posits that social structures and narratives are so pervasive 
that we can no longer be confident in the humanist faith in an essentialist, 
presocial, coherent, unified and autonomous self, because an ontology of this 
kind is based on "the fantasy of autogenesis."52 Rather, because "language 
speaks the subject" ,53 the self is constructed to the core. Derrida, for example, 
talks about the "death" of the subject,54 and Baudrillard calls for a 
"renunciation of the position of the subject."55 If postmodemists are accurate 
in this claim, then they obviously problematize traditionally received ideas 
about autonomy, freedom, choice, agency and responsibility.56 
Thirdly, postmodernists tend57 to be sceptical of liberal humanism's 
celebrations of "freedom", "liberty", '.'choice" and "opportunity", positing 
instead that given the twentieth century's less than impressive history 
(Auschwitz, Hiroshima, The Gulag and - I would add - Dresden) it may 
be better to think in terms of "imperialism", "colonization", "domination" and 
"control." For some self-confessed postmodernists, this engenders a 
47 F. Neitzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, W. Kaufman, ed. (New York: Random 
House, 1969) at 1 19. 
48 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979); K. Baynes, J. Bohman & T. McCarthy, eds., After Philosophy: End or 
Transformation? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987). 
49 H. White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism 69 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978). 
50 H. Lawson & L. Appignanesi, eds., Dismantling Truth: Reality in the Postmodern World 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1989). Baudrillard, for example, claims, "(t]he 
secret of theory is, indeed; that truth doesn't exist", J. Baudrillard, "Forgetting 
Baudrillard" ( 1986) 15 Social Text 140, 141 .  
5 1  As Derrida posits, "[d]econstruction is, in itself, a positive response to an alterity which 
necessarily calls, summons or motivates it. Deconstruction is therefore a vocation - a 
response to a call." Interview with Jacques Derrida (1981) reprinted in R. Kearney, ed., 
Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1984) at 1 17, 1 1_8. 
52 J. Butler, "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 'Postmodernism"' in 
J. Butler & J. Scott, eds., Feminists Theorize the Political (New York: Routledge, 1992) 
3 at 9 [hereinafter Theorize]. 
53 Milovanovic, supra note 24 at 3 1. 
54 Derrida, Grammatology, supra note 19 at 69. 
55 Shadow, supra note 42 at 107. 
56 See e.g., Schlag, Normative, supra note 24 at 173-174. 
57 I say "tend", because there are such self-identified people as "postmodern bourgeois 
liberals" and "post-modernist liberal communitarians". See R. Rorty, "Postmodernist 
Bourgeois Liberalism" (1983) 80 J. Philosophy 585 and A. Botwinick, Postmodernism 
and Democratic Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993) at 55. 
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"corresponding ideological commitment to minorities in politics, sex and 
language. "58 
Fourthly, postmodernists argue that, in order to better understand our 
current condition and the foregoing problematics, it is necessary to shift the 
conceptual framework to what is sometimes called the "discursive paradigm"; 
hence, there is a focus on "language", "language games", "text", "inter­
pretation", "discourse" and "discursive formations." 
Fifth, and finally, underlying all of tttese propositions is the sense that what 
is required is a reconceptualization of the nature and function of "power." 
Specifically it is proposed that we should abandon our idea of power as 
concentrated, top down and unidirectional, and replace it with a dispersed, 
pluralistic and multi-directional conception of power. 
These more general motifs and philosophical stances are reflected in, and 
elaborated upon, in the work of the two "popes of postmodemism":59 
Lyotard60 and Baudrillard.61 
In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,62 "presented to the 
Conseil des Universities of the government of Quebec",63 Lyotard identifies 
the challenges posed by "the postmodern condition" to our dominant 
philosophical traditions and, in particular, to the project of the Enlightenment. 
He argues that in science and politics there has been a philosophical tendency 
to create what he calls a "master-narrative" or "meta-narrative" that is 
designed to be a super explanation of reality. Liberalism and Marxism would 
both fall within his critique of this reduc(ionist quest. The problem, however, 
lies not so much in the explanatory aspirations (and, in Lyotard's opinion, 
inevitable failures) of such a grand narrative, but in its legitimation function. 64 
That is, by claiming that its interpretation is the account of reality, the master­
narrative imposes an orthodoxy and framework of analysis that aspires to be 
total and, in so doing, denies legitimacy to alternative experiences and 
marginalizes other interpretations. As the commentators Fraser and Nicholson 
point out, such a metanarrative claims to be "meta" in a very stringent sense: 
[I]t purports to be a privileged discourse capable of situating, characterising 
and evaluating all other discourses, but not itself infected by the historicity and 
contingency which render first order discourses potentially distorted and in 
need of legitimation.65 
58 I. Hassan as quoted in A. Wellmar, supra note 40 at 338. See also, Douzinas, supra note 
16 at x, xii and H. Giroux, "Modernism, Postmodernism and Feminism" in H. Giroux, 
ed., Postmodernism, Feminism and Cultural Politics (1991). 
59 Supra note 45 at 238. 
60 For a very helpful bibliography of works by and about Lyotard see the compilation by 
E. Yeghiayan in J.F. Lyotard, Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988) 77-112. 
61 Baudrillard has, on occasion, attempted to distance himself from postmodernism. See M. 
Gane, Baudrillard: Critical and Fatal Theory (New York: Routledge, I 991) at 66. 
62 Lyotard, Condition at supra note 19. 
63 Id. at xxv. 
64 Id. at 6. 
65 N. Fraser & L. Nicholson, "Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between 
Feminism and Postmodernism" in L. Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (New 
York: Routledge, 1990) at 19, 22. 
' 
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In short, in its aspiration to be authoritative, the master narrative becomes 
authoritarian. Scientific discourse is Lyotard's star example.66 
Postmodemism, we are told, signals a legitimation crisis for all such 
metanarratives by calling for an "incredulity"61 towards them. Lyotard's 
counter-argument to such totalizing interpretations is to embrace epistemo­
logical scepticism and to call for an espousal of heterogeneity, difference, 
contextualism and localism. By this he seems to mean that we should cease 
attempting to develop grand accounts and focus·more on micro-analyses of 
the interstices of the complex realities of social being. More specifically, 
Lyotard calls for a proliferation of "language games" or "narratives" arguing 
that a heterogeneous and competitive plurality can destabilize and 
delegitimize the dogmatism of the dominant narrative. This pluralistic 
economy of narratives he calls "paralogy"68 and posits that an embracement 
of dissensus avoids the totalitarian dangers inherent in all appeals to 
consensus: postmodernism "refines our sensitivity to differences and 
reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable."69 For Lyotard, 
difference, specificity, instability and incommensurability are the character­
istics of the postmodern experience. 
These ideas are further developed in two later books, Just Gaming (with 
J,L. Thebaud) and The Differend.10 Pivotal to both t.exts, but nonetheless 
elusive, are Lyotard' s conceptions of justice and injustice. Injustice, it seems, 
occurs when one "language game," "genre," or "narrative" gains such an 
absolute status that it effectively closes down all other narratives by claiming 
for itself a monopoly of "truth." Injustice is the failure to respect other 
narratives, an intolerance for alterity, the refusal to listen. Lyotard's 
preference is for a "justice of multiplicity"11 which favours an openness to a 
plurality of narratives72 which are incapable of being adjudicated by another 
narrative because there is no "universal" rule or narrative, "no common 
measure"73 or, as jurisprudents might say, no "grundnorm": 74 
As opposed to a litigation, a differend would be a case of conflict between two 
parties (at least) which could not equitably be decided for lack of a rule of 
judgement applicable to both argumentations. That one argumentation be 
legitimate would not imply that the other was not. If however one applies that 
same rule of judgement to both to decide their differend as i f  it were a 
litigation, one causes one of them a wrong [tort] (at least to one of them, and 
66 Lyotard, Condition, supra note I 9 at 47. 
67 Id. at xxiv. 
68 Id. at 60. 
69 Lyotard, Condition, supra note 19 at xxv. 
70 J.F. Lyotard & J.L. Thebaud, Just Gaming, trans. W. Godzich (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1985) [hereinafter Gaming]; J.F. Lyotard, The Dijferend: Phrases 
in Dispute, trans. G. Van Der Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988) [hereinafter Differend]. 
71 Lyotard, Gaming, id. at 59, 100. 
72 The legitimacy of each narrative is dependent upon a contingent configuration of internal 
conventions, procedures, norms or rules. Id. at 96. 
73 Id. at 50. 
74 H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. M. Knight (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1967) at 8. 
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to both if  neither admits this rule). A damage /dommage] is the result of an 
inquiry done to the rules of a genre of discourse and can be repaired in 
accordance with those rules. A wrong results from the fact that the rules of the 
genre of discourse according to which one judges are not those of the genre or 
genres judged . . . .  The title of this book suggests . . .  that a universal rule of 
judgement between heterogeneous genres is lacking in general.75 
Thus, for Lyotard, a wrong occurs when one's narrative is considered to be 
unintelligible to those who are judging, or when those who are judging fail to 
listen. This, as will become apparent, will be helpful in our quest to 
understand the juridical significance of the hunger strike. 
Baudrillard appears to go even further in his rejection of the Enlightenment 
project.76 He argues that such is the significance of technology - and in 
particular the mass medias77 - that we have moved into a condition of what 
I 
he calls "hyper-reality", that is, "the generation of models of a real without 
origin or reality."78 For Bau.drillard, we now live in a regime of the "code", a 
"semiotic network", where all. we have is a proliferation of signs, the infinite 
reproduction of copies without originals.79 As he elaborates: 
Today, the entire system is fluctuating in indeterminacy, all of reality absorbed 
by the hyperreality of the code and of simulation. It is now a principle of 
simulation, and not of reality, that regulates social life. The finalities have 
disappeared; we are now engendered by models. There is no longer such a 
thing as ideology; there are only simulacre.80 
In Baudrillard's "precession of simulacra" all our points of reference have 
been "liquified", meaning has "imploded", "the reality principle" trashed and 
the "theology of truth" discarded.8 1  Any purported distinction between 
progress and reaction is epistemologically unfounded as is "the difference 
between 'true' and 'false', between 'real' and 'imaginary' ."82 Values are 
indeterminate: 
In truth, there is nothing left to ground ourselves on. All that is left is 
theoretical violence. Speculation to the death, whose only method i s  the 
radicalization of all hypotheses . . . .  
The era of simulation is thus everywhere initiated by the interchangeability of 
previously contradictory or dialectically opposed terms. Everywhere the same 
75 Lyotard, Differend, supra note 70 at xi. 
76 Baudrillard, Writings, supra note 42. 
77 J. Baudrillard, "The Masses: The Implosion of The Social in The Media" ( 1985) 16 New 
literary History at 577-589. 
78 Baudrillard, Simulations, supra note 42 at 2. 
79 Id. at 83-1 15. 
80 Baudrillard, Writings, supra note 42 at 145. For Derrida's discussion of simulacre, see 
Writing and Difference, trans. A. Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) 
263, 284. 
8 1  Baudrillard, Simulations, supra note 42 at 4, 5, 1 2, 25, 57, 152. 
82 Id. at 5. 
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"genesis of simulacra:" the interchangeability of the beautiful and the ugly in 
fashion; of the right and the left in politics; of the true and false in every media 
message; of the useful and the useless at the level of objects; and of nature and 
culture at every level of meaning. All the great humanist criteria of value, all 
the values of a civilization of moral, aesthetic, and practical judgement, vanish 
in our system of images and signs. Everything becomes undecidable. This is the 
characteristic effect of the domination of the code, which is based everywhere 
on the principle of neutralization and indifference.83 
In such a world, the subject is but "a terminal of information."84 
According to Baudrillard, two political consequences emerge from these 
epistemological, sociological and ontological propositions. First, he asserts 
that power needs to be reconceptualized: 
No more subject, focal point, centre or periphery: but pure flexion or circular 
inflection. No more violence or surveillance: only 'information', secret with 
virulence, chain reaction, slow implosion and simulacra of spaces where the 
real effect comes into play.85 
Indeed, because "power is no longer present except to conceal that there is 
none"86 then "law and order themselves might be nothing more than a 
simulation."87 All of which is to say that "the political sphere (and power in 
general) becomes empty"88 so that "power pure and simple disappears."89 
Secondly, and as a direct consequence of this dispersed conception of power, 
the idea - indeed the very possibility - of political praxis needs to be 
reconsidered. Contrary to the emancipatory aspirations of, for example, 
Liberalism and Marxism, we can expect little by way liberation or transfor­
mation.90 Hyper-reality has had the effect of creating a condition of "hyper­
conformity" where resistance, if a viable prospect at all, can only take the 
form of "indifference", "silence", "inertia", "disaffection", "entropy" and 
"passivity."91 In short, according to Baudrillard, we are caught in a 
technological maze of mirrors from which there is no exit. Delerious from the 
reflections of reflections, we are so disoriented that not only can we not 
distinguish between forwards and backwards, we cannot even recognize 
ourselves. Overcome by vertigo, we drop. 
B. Deconstruction 
Deconstruction can be understood as a characteristic process of postmodern 
83 Baudrillard, Writings, supra note 42 at 124, 128. 
84 Baudrillard, Shadow, supra note 42 at 83. See also, his Fatal Strategies trans. B. 
Beitchman & W. Niesluchowski (New York: Semiotext(e), 1990) at 1 1 1- I 15 for a more 
extended conception of the subject. 
85 Baudrillard, Simulations, supra note 42 at 53-54. 
86 Id. at 40. 
87 Id. at 38 [emphasis in original]. 
88 Id. at 128. 
89 J. Baudrillard, Forget Foucault (New York: Semiotext(e), 1987) at 43. 
90 Baudrillard, Simulations, supra note 42 at I 09. 
9 1  Baudrillard, Shadow, supra note 42, passim. 
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analysis and so, for the purposes of this paper, I will briefly outline some of 
the central arguments of the "deconstructive angel of contemporary 
thought",92 Jacques Denida.93 Of pivotal importance are the ideas of 
"logocentrism", "hierarchy", "differance", "trace", "aporia", "reversal", 
"inscription", "margin", "supplement" and "alterity." 
For Derrida the most profound problem for (western) thought is the 
tendency to embrace the logic of what he variously calls "logocentrism" ,94 or 
"the metaphysics of presence. "95 Logocentrism is the ideal that it is possible 
for human beings to have an immediate, transparent and uncontaminated 
interaction with the context in which they find themselves. Derrida is 
skeptical of the possibility of there being any primordial origin or presence 
that pre-exists representation.96 Underlying such a presentist position, he 
argues, is the tendency to believe that there is some abstracted, absolute or 
anchor position, such as Truth or Reality. This is sometimes conceived of as 
foundationalism. The problem with such essentialist or foundationalist 
conceptions of reality, according to Denida, is that in adopting a naturalistic 
and necessitarian belief structure, they become totalizing and hierarichical, 
thereby excluding other conceptions of reality or truth.97 
Derrida's work, then, can be understood as an attempt to subvert founda­
tionalism by arguing that all our interactions are filtered through interpretive 
grids and, therefore, distanced from any original reality.98 He posits that our 
most basic norms, assumptions and theories are constructs and therefore 
dependent upon a plurality of conscious and unconscious factors. In pursuit 
of this strategy of ungrounding logocentrism, Denida develops the practice 
of "deconstruction" and the (non)concept99 of "differance." 
Deconstruction involves the process of "dismantling conceptual op­
positions, the taking apart of hierarchal systems of thought which can then be 
re inscribed with a different order of textual signification . . .  operating as a kind 
of strategic reversible." 100 As a form of internal critique, 101 deconstruction 
92 Supra note 34 at 291. 
93 For an extensive bibliography of works by and about Derrida, see G. Bennington & J. 
Derrida, Jacques Derrida (Paris: Seuil, 1991) at 327-376. Given Derrida's huge corpus 
of work, what follows is, unsurprisingly, a selective and partial interpretation. 
94 Derrida, Grammatology, supra note 19 at 11-12; J. Derrida, Positions, trans. A. Bass 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) at 5 1. 
95 Derrida, Grammatology, supra note 19 at 49. 
96 Id. at 36. 
97 'There is no such thing as truth in itself. But only a surfeit of it. Even if it should be for 
me, about me, truth is plural", J. Derrida, Spurs: Neitzche's Styles (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1979) at 103. 
98 Derrida, Positions, supra note 94 at 1 I .  
99 Derrida has insisted that, "Differance ... is neither a word nor a concept," see, J. Derrida, 
Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) at 
7 [hereinafter Margins]; J. Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on 
Husserl's Theory of Signs (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1973) at 135 
[hereinafter Speech]. See also, Derrida, Positions, supra note 94 at 9, 39. 
100 C. Norris, Derrida (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987) 19 [emphasis 
in original]. As Derrida himself puts it: 
On the other hand, we must traverse a phase of overturning. To do justice to this 
necessity is to recognize that in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing 
with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-a-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One 
of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper 
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involves two stages, a "double gesture." 102 First, there is a reversal or 
overturning of the hierarchy to bring "low what was high" 103 so as to 
demonstrate the epistemological arbitrariness of such a priorization. Secondly, 
there is a displacement of the (new) binary opposition in order to destabilize 
hierarchy itself and thereby to allow for a burgeoning of multiplicity. 104 
"Differance",ios which draws on the French verb "differer", suggests two 
things: "to defer, postpone or delay" as well as "to differ, to be non­
identical." As Balkin helpfully explains: 
Differance simultaneously indicates that ( I )  the terms of an oppositional 
hierarchy are differentiated from each other (which is what determines them); 
(2) each term in the hierarchy defers the other (in the sense of making the other 
term wait for the first term), and (3) each term in the hierarchy defers to the 
other (in the sense of being fundamentally dependent upon the other). 106 
Differance, as an interpretive strategy, demonstrates how "the trace" of "the 
other" is irrepressible. It illustrates how every concept that has ascribed to 
it a hierarchical (and therefore latently logocentric) significance is, in fact, 
irrevocably entwined with that which is reputedly trivial. That which would 
be priorized and superior is dependent upon that which is encoded as 
derivative and inferior. That which asserts its own autonomous, self-suffi­
cient and pure identity can only do so by differentiating itself from its 
constitutive other. Differance is relational and comparative, not intrinsic or 
essential. Consequently, "meaning" in a strong sense is unachievable be­
cause it is premised upon undecidable ambiguities: 
hand. To deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given 
moment. To overlook this phase of overturning is to forget the conflictual and 
subordinating structure of opposition. Therefore one might proceed too quickly to a 
neutralization that in practice would leave the previous field untouched, leaving one 
no hold on the previous opposition, thereby preventing any means of intervening in 
the field effectively. We know what always have been the practical (particularly 
political) effects of immediately jumping beyond oppositions, and of protests in the 
simple form of neither this nor that. 
Derrida, Positions, supra note 94 at 41. 
IO 1 The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are 
not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those 
structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and all the 
more when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all 
the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure, borrowing 
them structurally, that is to say· without being able to isola�e their elements and atoms, 
the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work. 
Derrida, Grammatology, supra note 19 at 24. See also Derrida, Positions, supra note 94 
at 24. 
I 02 Derrida, Positions, supra note 94 at 41. 
103 Id. at 42. 
104 Derrida, Margins, supra note 99 at 329. 
105 See e.g., Derrida, "Differance" in Speech, supra note 99 at 129. 
106 J.M. Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory" ( 1987) 96 Yale L.J. 743 at 752. 
As Derrida himself says, "On the one hand, [differer] indicates difference as distinction, 
inequality, or discernability; on the other, it expresses the interposition of delay, the 
interval of a spacing and temporalizing that puts off until "later" what is presently 
denied, the possible that is presently impossible". Derrida, Speech, supra note 99 at 129. 
See also Derrida, Positions, supra note 94 at 8-9. 
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[T]he meaning of  meaning . . .  is infinite implication, the indefinite referral of 
signifier to signifier . .  its force is a certain pure and infinite equivocality 
which gives signified meaning no respite, no rest, but engages it in its own 
economy so that it always signifies again and differs. 107 
By highlighting the antinominal, constructed and necessarily relational 
nature of that which would be incontrovertible, the technique of differance 
endangers and deflates logocentrism. Deconstruction - by emphasing the 
relational nature of our concepts, by discovering the mutual dependency of 
centre and margin, by demonstrating that the primary and the secondary are 
mutually implicative, by bringing into sharp relief the play of differance -
does not pursue a synergistic or dialectical third way. Rather, its aim is to 
uncover a plurality of possibilities and to demonstrate that what is 
centralized is dependent upon the repression of alternative contenders by 
relegating them to the margins. Derrida considers this process of 
foregrounding contradiction, anomaly and unjustifiable privileging to be em­
powering in that deconstruction creates the possibility for dismantling 
binary oppositions and revivifying that which has been submerged. In 
favouring cacaphony rather than harmony, deconstruction creates conditions 
hospitable to the "return of the repressed."'08 
One pragmatic consequence of deconstruction is that rather than having 
a false sense of certainty which, by necessity, is dependent on the repression 
of otherness, we are left with what Derrida calls an "aporia", a sense of 
doubt. 109 It is this moment of hesitation and undecidability, this sense of 
uncertainty, openness and contradiction that enlarges a space for the 
emergence (and potential valorization) of "alterity." For Derrida, "[t]he 
critique of logocentrism is above aJJ else the search for the 'other' and the 
'other of language' .""0 These alternative perspectives he sometimes calls 
"dangerous supplements."" 1 They are "dangerous" in that by producing a 
different narrative, they signify not just an addition to a "text", but an 
interrogation of the core assumptions of that text and, therefore, a 
decentering and ungrounding of a dominant interpretation: 
But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or 
i nsinuates itself in-the-place-of; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void. If i t  
represents and makes an image, i t  is by the anterior default of a presence. 
Compensatory . . .  and vicarious, the supplement i s  an adjunct, a subaltern 
instance which takes - (the) - place. 1 1 2  
107 J. Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. A.  Bass (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 
1978) at 25 [hereinafter Writing]. 
108 F. Jameson, Postm.odernism, or the Cultural logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1991) at 199. 
109 Aporia is derived from the Greek "unpassable path". 
1 10 Supra note 51 at 123. 
111  Derrida, Grammatology, supra note 19 at 141. "Supplement" is derived from the French 
verb, suppleer. 
112 Id. at 145. Elsewhere, Derrida defines supplement as an "undecidable", something that 
cannot "be included within philosophical (binary) opposition," something that resists and 
disorganizes philosophical binaries "without ever consisting a third term ... ; the 
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In sum, deconstruction offers the possibility (and that is all it is) of 
decentering conventional wisdom. 
Having mapped out some of the conceptual terrain of postmodernism and 
deconstruction, I think we are in a better position to revisit and re-envision 
the nature and significance of the hunger strike. Most specifically, in its 
potential valorization of "alterity" - in its affirmation of the existence and 
legitimacy of otherness - postmodernism allows space for, at least, a 
hearing of alternative and deviant perspectives.1 1 3 
IV. THE HUNGER STRIKE 
A. A History 
In this section, I develop a brief historical overview of events leading up 
to, and during, the Hunger Strike of 1 981 .  History, as every good 
postmodernist knows, is contingent upon a choice of starting points and 
. perspectives: it is partial (in both senses of the word) rather than total. 1 1 4 
Therefore, it is suggested that one can only fully appreciate the inter­
pretation offered in this article if I am explicit about my understanding of 
the historical context out of which the hunger strike arose.1 1 5 
The history of Ireland is a history of indigenous culture, invasion, domi­
nation, resistance, violence and tense accommodation. It is a history of 
Gaels, Vikings, Normans and Scots arriving in waves and awkwardly set­
tling in. Prior to the first Norman invasion of 1 167, Ireland was a relatively 
sophisticated society, divided into various kingdoms, with its own cultural 
supplement is neither a plus nor a minus, neither an outside nor the complement of an 
inside, neither accident nor essence". Derrida, Positions, supra note 94 at 43. 
113 As Bernstein has commented: 
Learning to live with the instability of alterity; learning to accept and to encounter 
radical plurality which fully acknowledges singularity - is always fragile and 
precarious. It makes no sense to even speak of a "final solution" to this problem -
the problem of human living. No one can ever fully anticipate the ruptures and new 
sites of the upsurgence of alterity. This is a lesson that we must learn again and again. 
And it has been painfully experienced in our time whenever those individuals or 
groups who have been colonized, repressed, or silenced rise up and assert the 
legitimacy and demand for full recognition of their own non-reducible alterity. 
R. Bernstein, The New Constellation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) at 75. 
114 As Hutcheon posits: 
To challenge the impulse to totalize is to contest the entire notion of continuity in 
history and its writing . ... The particularizing and contextualizing that characterize the 
postmodern focus are, of course, direct responses to those strong (and very common) 
totalizing and universalizing impulses. But the resulting postmodern relativity and 
provisionality are not causes for despair; they are to be acknowledged as perhaps the 
very conditions of historical knowledge. Historical meaning may thus be seen today 
as unstable, contextual, relational, and provisional, but postmodernism argues that, in 
fact, it has always been so. 
L. Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodemism (New York: Routledge, 1989) at 66-67. See 
also D. Attridge et al., eds., Poststructuralism and the Question of History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987) and W.G. Forbath, H. Hartog & M. Minow, "Legal 
Histories From Below" ( 1985) Wis. L. Rev. 764. 
115 Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this essay to provide a detailed overview of Irish 
history. What follows is designed to identify a broad context against which a more 
particular set of events can be understood. 
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codes and legal structures. 1 16 However, as England's first colony, 1 1 1  gradually 
over the course of eight centuries, these cultural norms and legal structures 
were modified and marginalized by an almost overwhelming military, cultural 
and juridical British presence. 1 1 8 Nevertheless, resistance continued and, in 
December 1 920, it was finally acknowledged by Britain that Irish indepen­
dence was inevitable. The problem, however, was that given the depth of the 
infiltration, a large segment of the population - particularly in the 
northeastern counties of the country - sought to remain part of Britain. The 
"solution", as it was then considered, was to partition Ireland: the southern 
twenty-six counties constituting an independent "Free State", the northern six 
counties comprising the statelet of Northern Ireland. The former would have 
its own republican government, the latter its own devolved government: 
Stormont. 1 19 From the early 1 920s to the late I 960' s, Britain remained 
relatively detached from Northern Ireland, allowing the local Parliament free 
reign over the affairs of the province. The result of this "protestant parliament 
for a protestant people" was "an orange state" in which "Loyalists" governed 
continuously in their own interests and Catholics were treated as second class 
citizens.120 Despite several minor military compaigns over the years against 
the "orange state", the IRA were a spent force. 12 1  
In the late I 960s, inspired by protest movements in both the United States 
and Europe, a coalition of relatively progressive groups came together to 
form the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) to protest 
discrimination against Catholics. 1 22 Although a few members of NICRA 
116 F.H. Newark, "The Bringing of British Law to Ireland" ( 1972) 23 N.l.l.Q. 3. 
I 17 W.J. Johnston, "The First Adventure of the Common Law" (1920) 36 L.Q. Rev. 9. 
118 For an overview of some of the practices and discourses of colonialization adopted by 
England see supra note 7 at 136- 150. Williams' point, in part, is that Ireland was an 
experiment for English colonialization of "American Indians". See also H.S. Pawlisch, 
Sir John Davies and the Conquest of Ireland: A Study in Legal lmperalism (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
I 19 Government of Ireland Act /920, 10 & I I Geo. V. c. 67. A.G. Donaldson, "The 
Constitution of Northern Ireland: Its Origins and Development" ( I 955) I I U. Toronto 
L.J. I .  C. Palley, "The Evolution, Disintegration and Possible Reconstruction of the 
Northern Ireland Constitution" (1972) I Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 368. 
120 J. Darby, Conflict in Northern Ireland: The Development of a Polarized Community 
(Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1976); J. Magee, Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict 
(Boston: Routledge, 1974); Sunday Times Insight Team, Ulster (Baltimore: Penguin, 
1971). Even British Government Inquiries concur with this assessment. See e.g., 
Disturbances in Northern Ireland (Cameron Report) ('1969) and Northern Ireland, House 
of Commons, Cond. 566 in Violence in Northern Ireland and Civil Disturbances in 
Northern Ireland in /969 (Scarman Report) ( 1972). 
121 T.P. Coogan, The I.R.A. (London: Fontana, 1987). 
122 As one commentator points out, 
"the demands of the civil rights campaigns ... centred on six main issues: 
I .  One-man-one-vote (sic) in local elections. 
2. The removal of gerrymandered boundaries. 
3. Laws against discrimination by local government, and the provision of machinery 
to deal with complaints. 
4. Allocation of public housing on a points (i.e. objective) system. 
5. Repeal of the Special Powers Act. 
6. Disbanding of the 'B Special' police force. This was a wholly Protestant armed 
militia particularly hostile to the minority [population] .. . " 
D.R. Lowry, "Internment: Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland" ( 1976) 5 Human 
Rights 261 at 263-264. 
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were Republicans, the vast majority of those involved were socialists and 
liberal democrats.123 In spite of the fact that the demands of NICRA were 
essentially reformist - in the sense that Catholics "sought equal citizenship 
within, not the destruction of Northern Ireland" 124 - the local state 
responsed with unmediated police repression. '25 Worse still, was the 
collusion between the paramilitary police forces of Northern Ireland and 
segments of the loyalist community whereby the former enabled the latter 
to embark upon vigilantism and pogroms which were so widespread that 
(prior to the current civil war in the former "Yugoslavia") they caused the 
greatest relocation of the civilian population anywhere in Europe since the 
Second World War. 126 
Thus, it can be argued that it was the repressive activities of the state -
both active and passive - which generated an upsurge in the legitimacy of 
the IRA, 127 because when the pogroms began, the only people even partially 
able to defend the catholic communities were very small numbers of IRA 
volunteers who had a few old rifles. 128 With no sign of the pogroms abating, 
and the Catholics very much under seige, the British government acknow­
ledged that the local security forces were so partisan that they were under­
mining the legitimacy of the British presence in Northern Ireland. As a 
result, in August 1 969, the British government decided to dispatch soldiers 
to carry out what was, in essence, a policing function.129 For several months, 
there was a honeymoon period between the British troops and the nationalist 
123 P. Bishop & E. Mallie, The Provisional IRA (Aylesbury: Corgi, 1987) at 48-53. 
124 M. MacDonald, "Blurring the Difference: The Politics of Identity in Northern Ireland" 
in Alexander and O'Day supra note 10 at 81, 82. This was confirmed by a subsequent 
British Commission of Inquiry which not only acknowledged the legitimacy of most of 
the civil rights protestors' claims (if not their actions}, but also reported that their 
demands would not "in any sense endanger the stability of the Constitution", Cameron 
Report, supra note 120 at 91. 
125 Bishop & Mallie, supra note 123 at 55-58. K. Boyle, T. Hadden & P. Hillyard, Law and 
State: The Case of Northern Ireland (London: Martin Robertson, 1975); Sunday Times 
Insight Team, supra note 120. 
126 F. Burton, The Politics of Legitimacy: Struggles in a Belfast Community (London or 
Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1978) at 69. C. Keena, Gerry Adams: A Biography 
(Dingle: Brandon, 1990) at 38. 
127 C.C. O'Brien, States of Ireland (London: Hutchinson, 1972) at 207. Scott argues, that 
"(t)he most repressive regimes are, then, the most liable to the most violent expressions 
of anger from below if only because they have so successfully eliminated any other form 
of expression", J.C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance (New Haven: Yale, 
1992) at 217. 
128 It is estimated that by the late 1960's, there were somewhere between sixty to one 
hundred fully fledged IRA volunteers in Belfast, Bishop & Mallie, supra note 123 at 81-
88, 108; Keena, supra note 126 at 26, 36. The response from the Catholic community 
to this defense was very mixed. While some members of the IRA seemed to have played 
quite a courageous role, the extent of the violence against the catholic communities 
resulted in a re-encoding of the acronym IRA as: I Ran Away. 
129 This was part of a two pronged strategy hastily developed by the British state. The other 
strategy was to put pressure on the Stormont regime to introduce a series of police and 
local government reforms to reduce the manifest discrimination that had continued for 
50 years. See e.g. D. Birrell & A. Murie, -Policy and Government in Northern Ireland: 
Lessons of Devolution (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1980); Palley, supra note 119. Such 
reforms, I would suggest, came too late and were offset by the first and determinative 
strategy: military intervention. For a further discussion of "determinative" see Devlin, 
"Law's Centaur", supra note 8. 
Vol. 14 The Irish Hunger Strike 25 
community. However, this began to deteriorate for several reasons. First, 
some soldiers started taking actions in favour of the loyalist community. 
Second, the IRA commenced a very tentative campaign against a 
reintensified British military presence on Irish soil. 1 30 Third, and most 
significantly, the British army imposed an extensive curfew and pursued 
house to house searches in the (predominantly catholic) Lower Falls area of 
Belfast in July 1 970. 13 1 
Though tension began to rise in 1 970 between the IRA and the British 
army, mostly in the form of rioting, it was not until February 1 971 132 that · 
the first British soldier was killed in Northern Ireland since the 1 920s and, 
in April, the IRA began to develop a bombing campaign. 
As to the legal regime in place from 1920 to the early 1970s, so extreme 
was Britain's abdication of responsibility for Northern Ireland, and so strong 
was its faith in the local government, that it willingly devolved its criminal 
law power to the Stormont regime. This enabled the Northern Ireland 
parliament, in the pursuit of "peace, order and good government", to pass 
the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 133 an 
extremely draconian set of permanent emergency powers laws. 1 34 Indeed, a 
South African Minister of Justice, John Vorster, once commented that he 
would be willing to "exchange all the [South African Coercion] legislation 
... for one clause of the Northern Ireland Special Powers Act."135 It was this 
Act and cognate legislation (and the plethora of regulations made pursuant 
to them) that created the local paramilitary police force and pr�vided the 
patina of legal legitimacy for the violent repression of the Irish civil rights 
movement of the 1960s. 
130 The IRA could not mobilize its resistance to this British military presence until after an 
acrimonious split between its "Official" and "Provisional" wings in January 1970. 
Bishop & Mallie, supra note 1 23 at 89-103; Keena, supra note 126 at 43. 
13 1  Sunday Times, supra note 120. 
132 Prior to this, several catholics had been shot and many more beaten by British troops. 
Sunday Times, supra note 120 at 290. 
133 12 Geo. V c.5. This Act was first introduced in 1922, updated annually, and made 
permanent in 1934. 
134 Walter Benjamin was one of the first to identify the phenomenon ,  of "permanent 
exceptionalism" when he argued: 
(t)he tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we 
live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain a conception of history that is 
in keeping with this. We still clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real 
state of emergency ... 
Quoted in W. Hamacher, "Afformative Strike" (1991) 13 Cardow L. Rev. 1 1 33, 1 150. 
For an early, but rare, British critique of such laws see National Council on Civil 
liberties, Report of a Commission of Inquiry Appointed lo Examine the Purpose and 
Effect of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland, 1922 & 1933) 
( I 936). 
135 G. Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom 22 (Dingle: Brandon, 1987). Quite possibly 
Vorster was referring to s.2(4): 
If any person does any act of such a nature as to be calculated to be prejudicial to the 
preservation of the peace or the maintenance of order in Northern Ireland and not 
specifically provided for in the regulations he shall be deemed guilty of an offence 
against the regulations. 
See also, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa and the Rule of Law 
(1968) which quotes extensively from the Special Powers Act in support of repression 
in the enforcement of apartheid. 
,' 
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When the IRA COIIlIT\enced the bombing campaign in 197 1 ,  the response 
of the Stormont government (consented to, and assisted by, the British 
Government1 36) was to invoke Regulation 1 2  under The Special Powers 
Act137 and introduce internment without trial. Three hundred and forty-two 
people, all Catholics, many of them without any connection to the IRA, 
were arrested in the first raid on August 9, 197 1 .  Within six months, a total 
of 2,357 people had been arrested (although not all were interned), the vast 
majority of them again being Catholics. 138 As a Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland subsequently explained: 
The Stormont Government [thought] quite reasonably, in their v�ew, if you 
were a Protestant you were a loyal figure, loyal to the government, loyal to 
the ethos of Northern Ireland against the South, against the Pope . . . .  
Therefore, you were a loyal person until proved otherwise. Whereas over the 
years the exact opposite was regarded of the minority community who (sic) 
was associated far more with the LR.A. than many of them actually were. 
And they, of course, were guilty of being on the side of the LR.A. until 
proved otherwise. The balance of proof was exactly the opposite way around, 
as one of the balances in the community to some extent still is. And 
therefore, there was no intelligence or very little intelligence about militant 
Protestant groups. Very little indeed. For the best of all possible reasons. The 
whole apparatus of the state wasn't directed against them. 139 
A large number of these. "presumptive terrorists" I40 were sent to a 
deserted World War Two air base near Belfast - Long Kesh - confined 
in compounds, installed in dormitory huts, and allowed to wear their own 
clothes, receive parcels and organize their own educational programmes. In 
effect, they were treated as prisoners of war and had "political status." I4 1  
136 Bishop & Mallie, supra note 123 at 143; R.J. Spjut, "Internment and Detention Without 
Trial in Northern Ireland 1971-1975: Ministerial Policy and Practice" ( 1986) 49 Mod. 
L. Rev. 712. 
137 S.R. & 0. (NJ.) 197L, No. 309. 
138 A. Feldman, Formations of Violence 86 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991 ); 
Spjut, supra note 136 at 735-736. In the following three and one half years a total of 
2,158 people were interned. P. Hillyard, "The Normalization of Special Powers: From 
Northern Ireland to Britain" in P. Scraton, ed., Law, Order and the Authoritarian State: 
Readings in Critical Criminology (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1987) 279 at 
285. 
139 W. Whitelaw, quoted in Spjut, supra note 136 at 736. 
140 See also the discussion of presumptive criminals in P. Fitzpatrick, "'The Desperate 
Vacuum': Imperialism and Law in the Experience of Enlightenment", Carty, Postmodern 
law, supra note 24 at 99, quoting Wolgar. 
141  J. McGuffin, Internment (Tralee: Anvil, 1975). Bishop & Mallie describe the conditions 
as follows: 
At Long Kesh they lived inside barbed wire compounds - 'the cages' - housed in 
Nissan huts . ... They were damp and hard to heat but they had their compensations. 
The cages were left to run themselves. Each one contained three huts housing about 
eighty men, a canteen, a shower hut and a Portakabin where the inmates could study. 
Internees and sentenced prisoners were in separate cages but shared the same regime. 
The life of the compound was controlled on loose military lines. Overall command 
was in the hands of the cage OC who was elected by all the men, and the huts in turn 
elected a leader. Each hut had a quartermaster in charge of gathering materials for 
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A much smaller number of "suspects" who were arrested and actually 
processed through the courts, were not sent to Long Kesh. Rather, on 
conviction, they were sent to the ordinary prisons and located in cells with 
no recognition of the political context for their "crimes", nor for the fact 
that they were arrested and processed under the Special Powers Act. As a 
result, in mid-June 1 972, about thirty republican prisoners who had been 
tried and convicted protested and, within a month, had gained not only 
recognition of their "special category status" - the government insisted on 
this term rather than "political status" - but also obtained transfers to Long 
Kesh prison camp where they were also allowed to structure themselves as 
if they were prisoners of war. Contemporaneously with the protest, there 
were negotiations between the IRA and the British government for a truce. 142 
Internment and "political/special category" status created a fundamental 
contradiction for the British state. On the one hand, Britain prided itself on 
being the great fountainhead of Magna Carta, 143 of habeas corpus, and most 
recently, the home of freedom having saved Europe from Nazism. And yet, 
the existence of several thousand untried prisoners in Long Kesh and 
elsewhere144 in Northern Ireland was an acute embarrassment. Thus in 1972, 
Lord Diplock (a senior member of the British judiciary) issued a Report of 
the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities 
in Northern lreland. 1 45 The primary goal of this report was to depoliticize 
the republican prisoners and to encode them "as criminals." To this end, 
Diplock proposed to eliminate the (delegitimizing) system of internment 
without trial and replace it with a streamlined (legitimizing) judicial process 
that could convict on the basis of confessions. This was to be achieved by 
three quite fundamental propositions. First, Diplock recommended that the 
escape and training, an education officer to organize lectures, and an intelligence 
officer. ... Into this little world the prison authorities barely intruded. 
Bishop & Mallie, supra note 123 at 269-270. Locally, Long Kesh was known as "the 
Republican University." 
142 By 1972, Britain had regained plenipotentiary powers over the affairs of Northern 
Ireland. As pointed out previously, Britain's response to "the troubles" was twofold: 
increased militarization and reform. The former alienated republicans, the latter unionists. 
In March 1972, the local unionist government resigned in protest against the reforms and 
Westminster passed Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972, 20 & 21 Eliz. 
II, c. 22. This Act prorogued the Northern Irish Parliament, enabled Her Majesty in 
Council to make all Jaws for Northern Ireland by order in Council and provided for a 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland who would act as chief executive officer for 
Northern Ireland. "Direct Rule", as this became known, was planned to last for only one 
year. It is stiJI in place in 1995. 
It is also worth noting that the British government did not abandon internment after the 
commencement of "direct rule"; instead it relabeJled it as "interim custody" and 
"detention" orders. [Detention of Terrorists (Nonhern Ireland) Order 1972 S.I. (N.I. 15) 
No. 1632]. Significantly, "terrorism" was defined in Article 2 as "use of violence for 
political ends." This acknowledgement of the politico-ideological dimension of dissent 
in Northern Ireland was carried over to the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
1973 c.53, as we shall see. 
143 25 Edw. I. 29 Ch. 1 ( 1297). 
144 While Long Kesh was the primary camp, it was not the only one. For a short period 
several hundred male prisoners were also held at McGilligan camp near the city of 
Derry. Women prisoners were held in the women's prison, Armagh. See N. McCafferty, 
The Armagh Women (1981). 
145 Cmnd 5185, ( I 972) [hereinafter Diplock Report]. 
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police should have power to detain suspects for questioning for up to three 
days. Secondly, those accused of "terrorist" offences were to be tried 
without a jury, in a single judge court. 146 Thirdly, and most importantly, the 
common law rules on the admissibility of confessions were to be radically 
changed so that the burden of proof was placed upon the accused to prove 
that the confession was "involuntarily" obtained. Moreover, the standard of 
involuntariness was to be that the accused must prove that s/he was prima 
facie subjected to "torture, inhuman or degrading treatment." Lesser levels 
of violence would not necessarily render a confession involuntary. 147 
The underlying agenda of this three point strategy was to reassert the 
supremacy of the rule of law over the politicization of law. Diplock's 
recommendations were put into effect in a refurbished Special Powers Act, 
specifically, ss.2, 6, JO Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
197 3. 148 In effect, this legislation created a conveyor belt criminal process, 149 
146 The justification provided by the Dip lock Report, id. at para. 15-17, was that jurors were 
subject to widespread intimidation in Northern Ireland. No reliable empirical data was 
ever provided for this assertion. For further discussion, see S. Greer & A. White, 
Abolishing the Diplock Courts ( I 986); D. Korff, Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland: A 
Fair Trial? (Utrecht: Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, 1983); J.W. Bishop, "Law 
in the Control of Terrorism and Insurrection: The British Laboratory Experience" ( 1978) 
42 Law & Contemporary Problems 140; J.D. Jackson & S. Doran, "Conventional Trials 
in Unconventional Times" (1993) 4 Crim. L.F. 503; J.D. Jackson & S. Doran, "Diplock 
and the Presumption Against Jury Trial" ( 1992) Crim. L. Rev. 755; J. Hunter, "How 
Justice is Done According to Diplock", Law Magazine 28, (27 November 1987); W. 
Twining, "Emergency Powers and Criminal Process" ( 1973) Crim. L. Rev. 407. 
147 In a classic of juridical casuistry that reflects the colonizer's assumption that the 
colonized are "presumptive criminals", Diplock suggested that interrogation should 
"build up an atmosphere in which the initial desire to remain silent is replaced by an 
urge to confide in the questioner", Diplock Report, supra note 145 at 30. For another 
example of self-imposed judicial myopia see Lord Gardiner's assertion: "But for the fact 
that there is no jury, the non jury courts are ordinary courts, sitting in public with 
variations in the law of evidence and procedures, which, on the whole, are not major 
ones." Report of the Committee to Consider, in the Context of Civil Liberties and Human 
Rights, Measures to Deal with Terrorism in Northern Ireland, para 24 ( 1975) 
[hereinafter Gardiner Report]. This echoes Diplock's claim that the traditional common 
law rules for controlling the admissibility of inculpatory statements were simply 
"detailed and technical". Diplock Report, supra note 145 at para 87. McGonigal L.J. was 
even more candid in his assessment of the impact of the changes as they were cast in 
legislative form: 
Treatment to come within Article 3 (of the European Convention) must be treatment 
of a gross nature. [The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act] appears to 
accept a degree of physical violence which could never be tolerated by the courts 
under the common law test, and if the words in (section 6) are to be construed in the 
same sense as the words used in Article 3, it leaves it open to an interviewer to use 
a moderate degree of physical maltreatment for the purpose of inducing a person to 
make a statement. It appears to me that this is the way the words must be construed 
and that this is the effect of the section. 
R. v. McCormick and Others, ( 1977) N.I. 105. He added, however, that there was still 
a residual and extra statutory judicial discretion to exclude evidence so obtained. Such 
judicial glosses became known as "the torturer's charter". See e.g. P. Taylor, Beating the 
Terrorists? (New York: Penguin, 1980) 77. 
148 (1973) c. 53. 
2.( 1) A trial on indictment of a scheduled offence shall be conducted by the court 
without a jury. 
(2) The court trying a scheduled offence on indictment under this section shall have 
all the powers, authorities and jurisdiction which the court would have had if they had 
been sitting with a jury, including power to determine any question and to make any 
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thereby rendering internment obsolete within a few years. 150 
However, it was soon realized that the Diplock process of 
"criminalization" did not go far enough in delegitimizing the political 
integrity of the republican prisoners because, once convicted, they were 
entitled to "special category status." The system was merely one of 
finding which would, apart from this section, be required 10 be determined or made by 
a jury, and references in any enactment to a fury or the verdict or finding of a jury shall 
be construed accordingly in relation to a trial under this section .... 
6.(1) In any criminal proceedings for a scheduled offence a statement made by the 
accused may be given in evidence by the prosecution in so far as it is relevant to any 
mailer in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the court in pursuance of 
subsection (2) below. 
(2) If, in any such proceedings where the prosecution proposed lo give in evidence 
a statement made by the accused, prima facie evidence is adduced that the accused was 
subjected 10 torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment in order to induce him to make 
the statement, the court shall, unless the prosecution satisfied them that the statement 
was not so obtained, exclude the statement or, if it has been received in evidence, shall 
either continue the trial disregarding the statement or direct that the trial shall be 
restarted before a differently constituted court (before whom the statement in question 
shall be inadmissible) .... 
10.(1) Any constable may arrest without warrant any person whom he suspects of 
being a terrorist. 
(2) For the purpose of arresting a person under this section a constable may enter 
and search any premises or other place where that person is or where the constable 
suspects him of being. 
(3) A person arrested under this section shall not be detained in right of the arrest 
for more than seventy-two hours after his arrest. 
(4) Where a person is arrested under this section, an officer of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary not below the rank of chief inspector may order him to be photographed 
and to have his finger prints and palm prints taken by a constable, and a constable may 
use such reasonable force as may be necessary for that purpose. 
(5) The provisions of Schedule I of this Act shall have effect with respect to the 
detention of terrorists and persons suspected of being terrorists. 
149 K. Boyle et al., Ten Years in Northern Ireland: The Legal Control of Political Violence 
(London: Cobden Trust, 1980) [hereinafter Ten Years]. For Sands' account of his own 
interrogation, prosecution and conviction under the Diplock System see, "The Crime of 
Castlereagh" and "Diplock Court" in Skylark, supra note 1 at 38-65. Two stanzas are 
indicative: 
There was no jury, none at all, 
The pig-in-the-wig was right, 
And only fools saw fit to stand 
And challenge him (sic) with fight. 
For this court is a farce, my friends, 
And justice knows no light. 
And men ask why men rise to fight, 
lo violence do resort, 
And why the days are filled with death 
And struggles' black report. 
But see they not, these blinded fools 
Lord Diplock's dirty court. 
Id. at 61, 65. 
150 Note, however, that the power to intern remained under s.10. For a very informative 
table of statistics on the levels of internment and detention in Northern Ireland, I 971-
1975, see Spjut, supra note 136 at 740. More precisely, once the Diplock system got 
underway, approximately 90% of the cases where guilty pleas were entered were based 
upon "confessions" made by prisoners. See e.g., Boyle et al. , Ten Years, supra note 149 
al 60-61 and D. Walsh, The Use and Abuse of Emergency Legislation in Northern 
Ireland (London: Cobden Trust, 1983) at 92. 
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avoidance and confession. As a result, Lord Gardiner (a former Lord 
Chancellor) was called upon by the British government to prepare a report 
that would further "rationalize" the programme of criminalization. He duly 
obliged and, in a Report published in January 1975, acknowledged that 
"special category status" was a "serious mistake" and should not be 
available to those who were convicted of crimes committed after 1 March 
1976. 151  
Central to the project of the removal of "special category status" and its 
replacement with a programme of "criminalization" and "normalization" 152 
were the elements of cellular rather than group confinement, and the 
wearing of prison uniforms. 153 When the first post-March 1st prisoner was 
given his uniform in September 1976 he replied, "If you want me to wear 
prison gear you will have to nail it to my back", 154 and being without 
clothes, he took refuge in the prison blankets. So began the "blanket 
protest." This was considered a breach of prison rules with the result that 
the prison governor imposed harsh penalties: "a complete removal of 
remission; twenty four hour lock-up; deprivation of mental stimulation of 
any sort - reading material, newspapers, books, television, radio, games, 
hobbies or writing material. This was combined with very intimate body 
searches" 155 and the reduction of visits to one half hour per month. By 
September 1977 there were about 160 republican prisoners "on the blanket." 
This situation continued with an entrenchment of positions through to 
April 1978. At that point, in response to further "disciplining" in relation to 
washing, as well as "internal searches of the body, deprivation of letters, 
removal to punishment cells and beatings of young prisoners", 156 the 
prisoners refused to wash or co-operate in any way with the prison staff. 
But the spiral did not stop with this "no wash protest." As part of their 
policy of non-participation, the prisoners refused to slop out their chamber 
pots. These pots, in tum, became part of the contested process in that they 
were frequently kicked over by prison guards in the course of the frequent 
searches. To prevent this from happening, and specifically to avoid the 
soaking and soiling of their floor-based mattresses, the prisoners threw the 
contents of the pots out the windows and under the doors of their cells, but 
these were slopped back in by the prison guards. In tum, by the end of 
I 978, this led to the "Dirty Protest", where the prisoners spread their own 
151 Gardiner Report, supra note 147 at 34-35. In February 1976, there were more than 1500 
"special category status" prisoners. · See Mc Feely et al. v. The United Kingdom, 20 
Council of Europe, Decisions and Reports 44 (1980). 
152 For further discussion of normalization see, M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The 
Birth of the Prison, 1st American ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977) at 183. 
153 Boyle et al. point out that "the requirement to wear a prison uniform ... was originally 
introduced as much as a means of humiliating prisoners as to facilitate the recapture of 
escapees .... " In support they cite the Prison Act of 1779 (19 Geo. III c. 74 s.35), which 
provided that prisoners "be clothed with a coarse and uniform apparel with certain 
obvious marks or badges affixed to the same as well as to humiliate the wearers as to 
facilitate discovery in case of escape". Boyle et al., Ten Years, supra note 149 at 96, 
119. 
154 L. Clarke, Broadening the Battlefield (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1987) at 50. 
155 D. Faul & R. Murray, H-Block and its Background (Belfast, 1980) at 483. 
156 Id. at 484. 
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excrement on the walls of their cells. 157 By 1979, there were approximately 
370 prisoners on the "Dirty Protest."'58 
As all the accounts of the "blanket", "no wash" and "dirty" protests 
indicate, it was clear that it was the prisoners who were setting the 
agenda. 159 However, while there was a significant mobilization outside the 
prison by groups such as the "Relatives Action Committee" and the "Smash 
H-Blocks Campaign" to publicize the prison conditions, this was not 
generating sufficient pressure to force the British government to change its 
policy of total criminalization. In the face of the indifference shown by the 
British government as 1980 wore on, the prisoners decided that in pursuit 
of "political status" they would have to resort to a hunger strike to force the 
government to recognize their claims. However, the· Army Council of the 
IRA objected to this intensification of the protest and Gerry Adams, as 
Vice-President of Sinn Fein, 160 communicated that the leadership of that 
organization was "tactically, strategically, physically and morally opposed 
157 Former Archbishop (and subsequently Cardinal) O'Fiach - a harsh critic of the IRA, 
though a supporter of a united Ireland - visited the prison in July 1978 and reported: 
Having spent the whole of Sunday in the prison I was shocked by the inhuman 
conditions prevailing in H Blocks 3, 4, and 5 where over three hundred prisoners are 
incarcerated. One would hardly allow an animal to remain in such conditions, let 
alone a human being. The nearest approach to it that I have seen was the spectacle 
of hundreds of homeless people living in the sewer pipes in the slums of Calcutta. 
The stench and filth in some of the cells, with the remains of rotten food and human 
excreta scattered around the walls, was almost unbearable. In two of them I was 
unable to speak for fear of vomiting . ... 
Several prisoners complained to me of beatings, of verbal abuse, of additional 
punishments (in cold cells without even a mattress) for making complaints, and of 
degrading searches carried out on the most intimate parts of their naked bodies. Of 
course I have no way of verifying these allegations, but they were numerous. 
Quoted in T.P. Coogan, On the Blanket (Dublin: Ward River Press, 1980) at I 58-159 
[hereinafter Blanket]. Sands' account of his experiences On the Blanket is to be found 
in his One Day in My Life (Cork: Mercier, 1983) [hereinafter Life]. 
158 It is to be noted that women republican prisoners in the Armagh jail also participated in 
the dirty protest which, due to menstruation, was even more difficult than the men's 
protest. Some women participated in the first hunger strike, but did not join the second 
hunger strike. See, Clarke, supra note 154 at 1 12-1 13, 125; and Coogan, Blanket, supra 
note 157 at 114-131, 2 13-224. 
159 Clarke, supra note 154 at 84-85, 105, 107, I 19, 121, 137; Coogan, Blanket, supra note 
157 at 95, 118, 224; Keena, supra note 126 at 86, 89, 100-102; Bishop & Mallie, supra 
note 123 at 288, 295; Feldman, supra note 138 at 161-164, 222, 230, 300; and 
Beresford, supra note 3 at xi, 20, 25, 37, 208, 251, 266-267; T.P. Coogan, The IRA 623-
627 (London: Fontana, 1987) [hereinafter IRA]. 
I emphasize this point for two reasons. First, it helps to lay the foundation for my 
discussion of agency in Part IV, B of this essay. Second, it is important to challenge the 
popular belief propagated by the British state that the Army Council of the IRA ordered 
the hunger strike. Consider, for example, Thatcher's statement that: 
The solution does not lie in our hands . . . it lies with the leadership of the Provisional 
IRA, who have taken the cold-blooded decision that the unfortunate men now fasting 
in prison are of more use to them dead than alive. 
Quoted in Beresford, supra note 3 at 148. 
Another example of misrepresentation is when Humphrey Atkins (Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland), on the occasion of Sands' death, stated that the latter had committed 
suicide "under the instructions of those who felt it useful to their cause that he should 
die." Quoted in Bishop & Mallie, supra note 123 at 296. The hierarchy of the catholic 
church also subscribed to this view. See e.g., Beresford, id. at I 99-200, 298. 
160 Sinn Fein is the unprescribed political wing of the IRA. 
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to a hunger strike. "161 In spite of these objections, on 10th October 1 980, the 
protesters announced a strike demanding "as of right, political recognition 
and that we be accorded the status of political prisoners .... " 162 On the 27th 
October, 1 980, seven prisoners went on a hunger strike.163 As the weeks 
progressed, despite the facade of intransigence on both sides, a series of 
secret negotiations proceeded through intermediaries.164 The result was that, 
as one of the fasting prisoners seemed that he was about to die prematurely 
on the fifty-third day, the British government appeared to acquiesce in the 
prisoners' demands by issuing a thirty four page document which seemed 
to suggest a step by step de-escalation process that would in effect reinstate 
"special category status." The strike was called off. However, as became 
apparent in December 1 980, the demands were not met and the prisoners 
felt outmaneuvered and betrayed. 
Thus, in January of 1 981,  Sands took the initiative and announced (once 
again in spite of objections from the military leadership of the IRA) that a 
new strike would commence. On this occasion, however, there was a shift 
away from the focus on "political status" to what became known as "The 
Five Demands": the right to wear their own clothing at all times; exemption 
from all forms of penal labour; free association with each other at all hours; 
the right to organise their own recreational and educational programmes; 
and full restoration of remission. It was thought that this change in the 
rhetoric would provide the British government with greater opportunity to 
compromise.165 The second hunger strike began on March 1st 1 981 ,  and the 
rest is history. Ten prisoners died before a compromise was reached in 
October 1991 .  166 But in the course of the fast, Sands - "the criminal" -
was elected to the British Parliament, Sinn Fein garnered remarkable local 
political support and international attention was focused not just on the 
161 Clarke, supra note 154 at 121. Note also that when, at a later stage, one of the strikers 
chose to terminate his fast because of a perforated ulcer, Sinn Fein supported his 
decision, id. 165. Furthermore, the Army Council of the IRA vetoed an attempt by the 
women prisoners in Armagh to join the second hunger strike, which would hardly be a 
wise move if propaganda was their only concern. Beresford, supra note 3 at 56. 
162 Clarke, supra note 154 ·at 123. 
163 Bobby Sands was not one of them as he was given the position of OC in the camp. 
164 Beresford, supra note 3 at 3-5. 
165 K. Kelley, The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the l.R.A. (London: Zed, 1988) at 
332-333. It might also be noted that on 4th July I 98 1 ,  after the deaths of the first group 
of four prisoners, the IRA once again issued an extremely conciliatory statement 
emphasizing the prisoners' rights aspect of the impasse: 
[l)n our view the issue wasn't that the British should come out and say openly that 
we were entitled to political status ... but rather that they should move to negotiate a 
solution within the prison. 
Quoted in Bishop & Mallie, supra note 123 at 296. 
166 In effect, the prisoners gained most of their demands after the families of those who had 
not yet died, but were in a coma, exercised their rights as next of kin to terminate the 
fast. Given that the strike ended first, the British government was able to make 
concessions without losing face. Specifically, prisoners were allowed to wear their own 
clothes; prison work was minimal, consisting mainly in cleaning and maintaining their 
own living areas; a significant degree of freedom of association was achieved; 50% of 
remission was restored; and violence by the wardens decreased significantly. However, 
quite severe restrictions on the type of literature available to them remained in place. See 
Clarke, supra note 154 at 201-202; Beresford, supra note 3 at 332; J. Feehan, Bobby 
Sands and the Tragedy of Northern Ireland (Dublin: Mercier, 1983) 137-138. 
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strike, but the intransigent British attitude to Ireland in general. 167 
B. An Interpretation: Fasting as (An)other Jural Claim 
33 
The previous section attempted to provide an historical narrative of events 
leading up to, during, and after the hunger strike. This section offers an 
interpretation of these events, drawing on some of the insights of 
postmodemism and deconstruction. 
As the discussion of postmodemism and deconstruction in Part III 
attempted to demonstrate, the hierarchical construction of relationships is 
central to logocentric thought. Derrida argues that all oppositions invoke "a 
violent hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, 
logically, etc.), holds the superior position." 168 This is particularly pertinent 
for an understanding of the politics (and pretensions) of law. The point of 
logocentrism is to attempt to render that which is contingent incontro­
vertible. Thus, within the dominant jurisprudential conception, law is 
conceptualized as both different from and hierarchically superior to politics 
in that the latter is acknowledged to be contaminated by vulgar interests, but 
law is said to be beyond the contingencies of politics. Law, from the liberal 
logocentric perspective, is a cognate of the uncompromisable virtues of 
Truth and Justice. Stated slightly differently, Law, or more precisely the 
rule of law, is the apotheosis of liberalism's commitment to rationality, 
order, progress and efficiency. 169 
Thus, in relation to the hunger strike, one reason the British government 
was so keen to "criminalize" the prisoners was to draw on the logocentric 
legitimacy of law, so as to put the issue of nationalist claims for self­
determination beyond debate; that is, to enforce closure by juridical fiat. 
Thatcher made much of this on a visit to Belfast after the deaths of several 
of the prisoners: 
167 One commentator summarizes the media response as follows: 
[At the beginning of the fast] the media, too, paid only passing attention to Bobby 
Sands, but when he was elected to Westminster on April 9th the issue could no longer 
be ignored. As his death neared, the world's press flooded into Belfast. Some 23 
nations sent camera crews, and the American TV networks, ABC, CBS and NBC, 
sent 16 camera ciews. There were at least 400 reporters in the North, and 300 
photographers covered his funeral. 
When Bobby Sands died, on May 5th, the international reaction was spectacularly 
unflattering to the British government. There were demonstrations across the world, 
accompanied by widespread condemnation of the government's failure to resolve the 
issue. At the end of May, The Sunday Times published a survey of foreign press 
reaction, titled 'ls Britain Losing The Propaganda War?', for which it had canvassed 
the views of 64 newspapers. The Sunday Times' chief European correspondent, Keith 
Richardson, was quoted as saying, "General European impression ranges from pig­
headed Thatcher obstinacy, through scandalous misgovernment, to outright genocide. 
In other words, it could not be worse." The article concludes that: "world opinion has 
begun to shift away from the British government and in favour of the IRA. The image 
of the gunman has actually improved. And the general opinion is emerging that the 
time has come for Mrs. Thatcher to begin negotiations with DubHn leading to 
eventual union with the South." 
L. Curtis, "How The Media Reported It" in Ten On Ten 20 (Belfast: 1991) reprinted 
from L. Curtis, Ireland - The Propaganda War (London: Pluto, 1984). 
168 Grammatology, supra note 19 at lxxvii. 
169 See e.g., R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1986). 
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Now what I am saying i s  we will uphold the law. We will do everything to 
help the people of Northern Ireland to help themselves out of this difficulty. 
I cannot pull solutions out of a hat. I will not depart from upholding the 
law . . . .  110 
As Michael Ryan reminds us, "[t]he authority of the sovereign's law 
depends upon the establishing of unambiguous proper meaning for 
words."11 1 In Northern Ireland of the mid- 1970s and early 1 980s, the con­
tested terms were "law" and "criminal." The republican prisoners, however, 
refused to acquiesce in this totalizing trope of criminalization. They sought 
to destabilize and invert this hierarchical move by demonstrating the 
inherently political and partisan nature of the British legal machinery. They 
called into question the rationalistic and progressive self-image of law, so 
as to tell a different story. 
Three examples illustrate these strategies of resistance that sought to 
undermine the British state's logocentric ambitions, and law's "elective self­
image."172 First, the whole purpose of seeking "special category status" via 
the protests of 1 972 was to demonstrate the profoundly political nature of 
the Special Powers Act, that it was precisely because of draconian politics 
that they were being held "at Her Majesty's pleasure." A second example 
of resistance is that the prisoners themselves (and contrary to the IRA 
leadership's traditional policy of political abstentionism 173) came up with the 
idea of proposing Sands as a candidate for the British Parliament. 174 His 
election by over 30,000 voters - with a majority of 1 ,446 - not only 
legitimized the demands for political status but also gave notice to the 
Thatcher regime that political consciousness cannot simply be re-encoded 
by politico-juridical relabelling. Moreover; and seemingly learning nothing, 
when Sands died, the British government hurriedly passed the mendaciously 
entitled, Representation ojthe People Ad75 to prohibit any further prisoners 
from fulfilling a democratic mandate in "the mother of all parliaments." But 
this also failed because in Sands place, his election agent increased the 
margin of victory by 786 votes. In sum, the British government attempted 
to use the law to privilege one ideological perspective; the prisoners resisted 
such a move by asserting a contradictory claim thereby shearing law of its 
metaphysical privileges. As Derrida posits "[t]o deconstruct the 
opposition ... is first to overthrow the hierarchy." 116 Viewed in this light, 
170 Beresford, supra note 3 at 179-180. 
171 M. Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1982) at 3. 
172 Norris, supra note 100 at 80. 
173 Traditionally, the IRA has adopted the position of political abstentionism on the basis 
that the Treaty of 1921, which recognized the division of Ireland into two distinct states, 
was a betrayal of the republican tradition. For the IRA any parliament in either the North 
or South of Ireland established under that Treaty was illegitimate, and therefore, should 
be boycotted. 
174 Clarke, supra note 154 at 140. 
175 Representation of the People Act, 1981, Ch. 34 in "Law Reports, Statutes 1981", 29 & 
30 Elizabeth 2, I at 50 I .  
176 Grammatology, supra note 19  at lxxvii. 
Vol. 14 The Irish Hunger Strike 35 
deconstruction helps us to dismantle the antinomian relationship of law and 
politics, enabling us to confirm that law is .always and already constituted 
by politics. Or, if we invert Clauswitz's aphorism so that it reads, "politics 
is war by another means", 1 77 and supplement it with the proposition that law 
is politics by another means, then law is war by another means. 
But I have a larger point that draws even more acutely on what might be 
called the "productive" rather than the "destructive" dimensions of 
deconstruction. 118 Derrida argues that "the task [of deconstruction] is . . .  to 
dismantle the metaphysical and rhetorical structures which are at work [in 
the text], not in order to reject or discard them, but to reinscribe them in 
another way."1 19 A central step in this process is what he calls "overturning" 
or "reversal": 
To overlook this phase of overturning is to forget the conflictual and 
subordinating structure of opposition. Therefore one might proceed too 
quickly to a neutralization that in practice would leave the previous op­
position, thereby preventing any means of intervening in the field 
effectively. 180 
The reinscription that I want to suggest is the reverse propos1t10n that 
although the hunger strike demonstrated the politics of British law, it was 
also an indigenously Irish legal claim, the articulation of what Geertz has 
called an al_terior "legal sensibility", another "form of juristical life."1 8 1  
To elaborate: most of the conventional reviews of hunger striking in 
Ireland trace back only as far as the practice had been adopted by the 
Republican movement. 182 Such an historical account identifies the hunger 
strike with the political ideology of Republicanism. 183 However, this is only 
a partial account. 
Hunger striking is not a recent phenomenon in Ireland. It is not simply 
a Republican practice. On the contrary, its roots can be traced back to an 
ancient, pre-Christian, Celtic legal code, the Brehon Laws 184 and the practice 
177 C. Von Clausewitz, On War (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968) at 87. 
178 This is a point that I want to emphasize. Although in later parts of this essay I will 
criticize deconstruction, it is not because I identify it with destruction which is the facile 
critique offered by so many of its detractors. Rather, my point is that it is not suf iciently 
productive. 
179 Grammatology, supra note 19 at xxv. 
180 Positions, supra note 94 at 41. 
181 C. Geertz, Local Knowledge (New York: Basic Books, 1983) at 175, 215, 185. 
182 For example, it is usual to point to the deaths by hunger strike of Thomas Ashe and 
Terrance Mcsweeny in 1917 after the Easter Rising; Tony D' Arey, Jack MacNeela and 
Sean MaCaughey in the 1940s in the Republic of Ireland; and Michael Gaughan and 
Frank Stagg in the 1970's as they sought repatriation from English jails to Ireland. See 
e.g., Adams, supra note 135 at 70; Alexander & O'Day, Introduction, supra note 10 at 
6; Coogan, Blanket, supra note 157 at 14-30; Clarke, supra note 154 at 107- 108; 
Feldman, supra note 138 at 218. 
183 Moran has noted that, "(s]ince 1916 nearly 9000 Irish republicans have gone on hunger 
strike, of whom at least 22 have starved themselves to death". S. Moran, "Patrick Pearse 
& Patriotic Soteriology" in Alexander & O'Day, eds., supra note 10, 9 at 20. 
184 For an overview of the Brehon laws see e.g., R. Grimes & P. Horgan, Introduction to 
the Laws of the Republic of Ireland (Dublin: Wolfhound, 1987) at 17-21. 
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of cea/,achan or troscead, that is, fasting. Cealachan/troscead is a 
component of the ancient Irish Law of Athgabhail/Athgabal which, in 
common law terms, one could consider to be analagous to distraint. 1 85 
Athgabhail "is a general name for every coercion (lit. binding) through 
which each person enforces his [legal] interest." 186 It is invoked, as Ginnell 
points out, so that "advantage is obtained after disadvantage ... truth after 
untruth, legality after illegality, justice after injustice . . .  right after wrong." 1 81 
Troscead - fasting_ - is the performative act that, in certain legally 
specified circumstances, triggers the action in distraint. Stated simply, if a 
person had been wronged by another who was more powerful - for 
example, a chieftain, brehon, bard, king, bishop, or even God by some 
accounts 188 - the wronged party, having given appropriate notice, was 
entitled to claim distress by fasting at the door of the wrongdoer. 
Responsibility for ending the fast vested in the perceived wrongdoer. If the 
latter allowed the plaintiff to starve to death, then the wrongdoer was held 
responsible for the death, and had to compensate the victim's family. 189 
A central proposition advanced by this essay is that, building upon not 
only the political tradition of previous republican hunger strikes, but also 
upon the legal tradition of the Brehon Law, at the margin of the British state 
in the H-Blocks, the prisoners rediscovered and reconstituted an almost 
silenced countervailing legal regime. The hunger strike, then, was not 
simply a desperate, last ditch propaganda stunt, as the dominant 
interpretation would have us believe. 1 90 Rather, the fast was a "painful re-
185 See S. Bryant, Liberty, Order and Law Under Native Irish Rule (Washington: Kennikat 
Press, 1970) at 259-287; L. Ginnell, The Brehon Laws (London: Fisher Unwin, 1894) 
at 161-164; F. Kelly, A Guide to Early Irish Law (Dublin: Institute for Advanced 
Studies, 1988) 177-188; D.A. Binchey, "Distraint in Irish Law" ( 1973) 10 Celtica 22. 
It is to be noted that Kelly, writing after the 1981 hunger strike, makes a point of 
emphasizing that "the use of fasting for political purposes in the hunger strike is distinct 
from legal fasting", id. at 182. However, he provides no arguments or references for this 
positivistic assertion. 
186 Binchey, id. at 29. 
187 Ginnell, supra note 185 at 158. 
188 There has been no systematic synthesis or review of the diverse situations in Irish myths 
and history when fasting has been invoked. The most extensive discussions that my 
research has discovered (in English) are D.A. Binchey, "Irish History and Irish Law" 15 
Studia Hibernica 7, 24-27 and F.N. Robinson, "Notes on the Irish Practice of Fasting 
as a Means of Distraint", S. Williams, ed., Putnam Anniversary Volume 557 (New York: 
Ams Press, 1976). 
189 It might also be noted that the practice of fasting can be traced to another pre-imperialist 
legal culture, the Indian practice of "sitting Dhama". This practice was revived by 
Mahatma Ghandi who fasted seventeen times against the British Raj. Others have also 
adopted the practice, most notably the suffragettes and Martin Luther King. W. B. Yeats 
wrote a play about fasting in 1904, "The King's Threshold," at the conclusion of which 
the poet/plaintiff gave up his fast. After the Easter Rising i� 1916, and the execution of 
many of the republican leadership, Yeats rewrote the last section so that the poet/plaintiff 
continued the fast until death. W.B. Yeats, "The King's Threshold" in The Collected 
Plays of W.B. Yeats 105 (London: MacMillan, 1982). Sands also discovered his poetic 
side while in prison, see Skylark, supra note I .  
190 Of the "dirty protest" the Northern Ireland Office stated: "This protest action is the basis 
of a propaganda campaign which has been mounted by the IRA." Quoted in Coogan, 
Blanket, supra note 157 at 162. This propagandist interpretation was also disseminated 
by the hierarchy of the catholic church and the political elite of the Republic of Ireland, 
id. at 178, I 84, 186. 
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remembering, a putting together of a dismembered past to make sense of the 
trauma of the present." 191 In short, the hunger strike was an erruption of an 
alterior juridical regime, the espousal of a cultural difference, the exposition 
of a jural other, the assertion of a legal right. 
It is important to note how this coming to consciousness came about. The 
agenda of the British state, as it always has been in Ireland, was to eliminate 
the foundations of Irish identity, to totally erase locations of resistance. It 
realized that internment (to a greater extent) and the Diplock courts (to a 
lesser extent) served to strengthen the integrity and legitimacy of the 
republican cause. It recognized that by taking activists from their 
communities, by imprisoning them through the ideological trope of 
criminalization, they could perhaps silence the nationalist "other." 192 But, at 
the same time, it was understood by the government that by continuing with 
"special category status" it was allowing the persistence of two 
contradictions within its policies. First, "special category status" was simply 
a euphemism for "political status" and therefore a discordant acknowl­
edgement that there may be a certain legitimacy to the republican liberation 
struggle. Second, and just as important, "special category status" acknowl­
edged the military structure of the IRA and allowed free association and 
control over the recreational and educational processes within Long Kesh 
to accrue to the military command of the IRA. In other words, the British 
government realized that internment and "special category status", though 
they temporarily divorced the IRA from the Nationalist community, would 
have the effect of facilitating the emergence of what Sands would later 
describe as the: 
politically educated armed guerilla fighter who will not only use his (sic) 
political mind to guide his weapon, but to guide and teach his politically 
undernourished countrymen to steer their own destiny . . . .  193 
It is also worthwhile to point out that the fasting prisoners had no illusions that this was 
a mere political gamble. It was clear to Sands, for example, that as a purely political 
lever, the fast would not change the attitude of the Thatcher regime. Moreover, as a 
political strategy, such a strike does not make instrumental sense because it sacrifices 
some of the best intellects of the organization, its leadership (both present and future) 
and its most dedicated members. 
I 9 I H. Bhabha, Forward, F. Fan on, Black Skin, White Mask, trans. C. Markmann (New 
York: Grove, 1968) at xxiii. 
192 An analogy here might be drawn with J. Perlman, The Myth of Marginality (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, I 976) which argues, in th_e context of Rio de Janiero, how 
the discourse of "marginality" serves the ideological and repressive purposes of the 
power elites. She argues that marginality theory constructs squatters as a blight or 
parasite on society; how it portrays them as deviant and uncivilized; how it structures 
them as a sort of folk devil, the cause rather than effect of poverty. Much the same, I 
would suggest, could be said about the "myth of criminality" in Ireland. 
193 Sands, Training Camp, in Skylark, supra note I at 149. Sands continues in this piece to 
elaborate on how, through the Gaelic language, the prisoners developed their thinking 
about the creation of an Irish "Socialist Republic." Commentators have described Long 
Kesh as "a research department for the Republican movement", Bishop & Mallie, supra 
note 123 at 275. For a similar suggestion as to the experience of some Black prisoners 
in the United States see G. Jackson, Soledad Brother: The Prison letters of George 
Jackson (New York: Coward McCann, 1971) at 30. 
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Consequently, it was determined by the British government that the 
repression would have to be intensified. First, in order to undermine the 
process of political radicalization fostered in Long Kesh (the "Republican 
University") it was necessary to rethink the architecture of coercion so 
as to undercut the groupist solidarity that the traditional, military-type 
cage structure engendered. As a result, there emerged the idea of H­
Block compounds which would isolate and atomize each prisoner. 194 
These compounds were blocks of prison cells constructed in the shape of 
an H with four wings connected by an administrational cross-bar. Each 
block was capable of containing approximately eighty prisoners, each 
prisoner to be held in an eight foot by ten foot cell. 195 Second, 
deradicalization required that both the nationalist community and the 
prisoners themselves 196 cease accepting the code or signifier of "prisoners 
of war" and instead adopt the penal bureaucratic argot of "ode" (ordinary 
decent criminal) or "hac" (honest average criminal). 1 97 As Nietzche 
reminds us, "[e]very society has the tendency to reduce its opponents to 
caricatures - at least in imagination - and, as it were, to starve them. 
Such a caricature is ... our 'criminal' ." 1 98 It was this quest for the penal 
construction of "the criminal" that generated the Gardiner Report's 
emphasis on uniforms, prison work, discipline and the curtailment of 
opportunities for association and education. 
194 Although my claim in this essay is not to relate the rule of law to fascism, it is worth 
noting that the SS had a similar agenda of atomization in their concentration camps, B. 
Moore Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (White Plains: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1978) at 62-63. 
195 For a poetic account of the "architecture of coercion", see L. McKeown, "Hardlines", 
B. Campbell, ed., H. Block: A Selection of Poetry from Republican Prisoners 44 
(Sheffield: South Yorkshire Writers, 1991). For another account of how the British 
security forces have an impact on the architecture of coercion, not in the prison but in 
relation to urban planning in Belfast, see P. Hillyard, supra note 138, 279 at 291. 
196 Once again, Sands gives us an insight into the psychological dimensions of the penal 
encoding system: 
I can hear heavy footsteps approaching. They stop quite near to me. There is someone 
or something nearby. I can hear it moving and breathing. It is watching me. More 
noise directly outside my tomb, a rattle of metal against metal. A square form of light 
begins to materialize, revealing an entrance as the door swings open. A figure stands 
in the grey dim light of the doorway. It is a human figure, dressed in what appears 
to be some sort of black uniform. It stands scrutinizing me in silence for several 
seconds before letting out a terrifying yell that sends shivers through my body. "I am 
Sir!" The words echo around my tomb. "I am Sir !" it bellows again. "I am Sir, you 
are 1066!" The door slams shut with a loud explosive boom, killing the dim light 
where the entrance had been. Still afraid to move I stand in total darkness. 
What is l 066, I think? Obviously it is me, but I can think, speak, smell and touch. 
I have all my senses, therefore I am not a number, I am not 1066. I am human, I am 
not a number, I am not 1066! Who or what is a Sir? It frightened me. It was evil. I 
sensed its hatred of me, its eagerness to dominate me, and its potential violent nature. 
Oh, what will become of me? I remember I once had a family. Where are they now? 
Will I ever see or hear of them again? 
Sands, "I am Sir, You are 1066", Skylark, supra note 1 at 103-104. For a homologous 
account of how the law seeks to "encode the female body with meanings", "terrorizing" 
it and thereby forcing it "to scurry, to cringe and to submit" see M.J. Frug, supra note 
24 at 1049-1050. 
197 Coogan, Blanket, supra note 157 at 6, 13. 
198 F. Neitzsche, The Will to Power, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1968) 
at 202. 
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But at the margins of the British state, almost absented from the dominant 
discourse and almost delegitimized within the Nationalist communities, the 
prisoners continued their resistance. First, drawing on the significant 
increase in the educational aspects of Republican tradition in the last years 
of "special category status", the H-Blocks became both a conduit for the 
dissemination of Irish history and a school for reflection on leftist-inspired 
revolutionary strategies. 199 Secondly, and of crucial importance to this 
process of consciousness raising, was the switch to the use of the Irish 
language. This was required because the new cellular structure of the H­
Blocks re.quired ·that if the prisoners sought to communicate with each other 
they would have to shout. But shouting in English would, obviously, render 
their communications accessible to the prison guards. Shouting in Irish 
would only lead the guards to learn Irish. The solution was to encode the 
conversations in a modified version of the Gaelic language that the 
prisoners, with an earnest humour,200 called "jailic."201 Thirdly, this 
translation, in turn, engendered a greater familiarity with Irish history. Of 
particular significance was the interrogation of the legal foundations of 
British colonialism and the rediscovery of the ancient Irish Brehon laws 
and, most notably for the purposes of this essay, the practice of troscead. 
Thus, having disinterred through praxis a "juridical unconscious"202 (Brehon 
law) the prisoners located themselves in a counterhegemonic legal space, in 
a different legal culture. 
As a result, when the announcement of the I 0th of October 1 980 claimed 
that the hunger strike was based on "a right", it was not simply rhetoric. 
The prisoners did not base their claim solely on the terrain of political 
struggle, or the Republican tradition of self-immolative martyrdom,203 these 
being the two conventional interpretations given for the strike. Rather, the 
fast was a profound juridical claim premised upon a subordinated, and 
therefore ex-centric but not eliminated, legal culture.204 Indeed, a recently 
published interview with a former prisoner of the hunger strike period 
199 Beresford, supra note 3 at 60; Sands, Skylark, supra note I at 149-150. 
200 For insightful discussions of the politically progressive dimensions of humour and 
"carnival", see M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. H. lswolsky (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1968). The work of Sands, despite its understandable pessimism, continually 
manifests a wry humour. For example, when describing his last piece of fruit before 
embarking on the fast, he quips, "as fate had it, it was an orange, and the final irony, it 
was bitter", Sands, Skylark, supra note I at 154. 
201 Clarke, supra note 154 at 80; Feldman, supra note 138 at 225. 
202 This idea is culled from F. Jameson, The Political Unconscious (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1981). For a further discussion of this dialectial conception of the 
relationship between praxis and consciousness, see R. Fantasia, Cultures of Solidarity 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) at 10-13. 
203 Moran, supra note 183 at 9. 
204 On a symbolic level, it might also be worth reflecting as to why only four prisoners were 
originally chosen for the second hunger strike, when seven were chosen for the first. The 
choice of seven has been explained as including one member of the IRA from each of the 
British-occupied six counties of the North of Ireland, plus one member of the Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA). No explanation has been given for the choice of four. One 
conjectural suggestion that I might make is that, as one scholar points out, Atgabhal is based 
upon a multiplicity of four-part divisions and subdivisions, see, Binchey, supra note 185. 
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indicates just how important this juridical "langscape"205 was: 
With the Gaelic you begin to get back in touch with political and ideological 
concepts. For instance cealathan, where in the Brehon laws to express a 
grievance against an injustice a guy sat outside the wrongdoer's house and 
starved himself to death. Now cealachon [sic] had a whole moral import to 
it that it wasn't a hunger strike as a protest weapon; i t  was the legal assertion 
of you� rights. The hunger strike was a legitimate and moral means for 
asserting those rights, and i t  had legal precedents dating back to antiquity. 
You found that there was a literature that was untranslatable from the Gaelic 
that could never be expressed in the cold English.206 
The particular difference is that rather than formulating their claim in some 
formalistic and bureaucratic cause of action - a form of encoding or 
translation that severs the plaintiffs from their claim - the fasting prisoners 
reconstituted their bodies as a jural template so that their claim was, 
literally , one of life or death. That this legal claim, this continuation of what 
one scholar has called "the long and winding river of Irish Iaw",207 was 
unintelligible - "untranslatable" - to the common law world should come 
as no surprise given legal colonialism's long history that can be traced as 
far back as 1280 AD when King Edward I opined that the laws of Ireland 
were "so contrary to all laws that they ought not to be called laws."208 The 
common law (like the "reasonable man") is jealous and can tolerate "no 
other order."209 
Let me attempt to [re]write this wrong in a slightly different way. As the 
deconstructive approach points out, hierarchial dichotomies help structure 
understanding. British legal logocentrism operated on the following 
hierarchies: law/violence, law/politics, Common law/Brehon law, law/non 
law. Deconstruction, as we have seen, first operates a temporary reversal so 
that we can have a re-ordering: violence/law, politics/law, Brehon 
law/common law, non law/law. Then, deconstruction makes a second 
gesture (displacement) in order to demonstrate the arbitrariness of such a 
refoundationalist strategy, thereby collapsing the categories. The result, 
however, is not synthesis or a dialectical third way. Rather it is a 
recognition of the mutual contamination and infiltration of: law and 
violence, of law and politics, of the non-legal and the legal, and of the 
plurality of the forms of law. The recognition of traces of each side of the 
dichotomies in the other generates uncertainty and hesitation: an aporia 
(doubt). The implicit suggestion generated by such doubt is to remind us 
that an appropriate response in such a situation might be modesty and a 
205 For a discussion of the importance of "langscape" for aboriginal rights claims, see, J. 
[Sakej) Youngblood Henderson, "Mikmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada" ( 1995) 18 Dal. L.J. 
206 Feldman, supra note 1 38 at 214. 
207 D.A. Binchy, "Irish History and Irish Law: II" (1967) 16 Studia Hibemica 7 at 33. 
208 Quoted in K. Simms, "The Brehons of Later Medieval Ireland", D. Hogan & W.N. 
Osborough, eds., Brehons, Serjeants and Attorneys (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1990) 
51 ,  67. 
209 Z. Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (New York: Routledge, 1992) at xv. 
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recogmt10n of the vulnerability of our taken for granted assumptions. 
Therefore, rather than seeking to erase the other by solipsistically and 
ruthlessly enforcing one's own preferred hierarchy an alternative possibility 
is tolerance, reciprocity and openness. Such an "ethics of Otherness", as 
Balkin points out, "demands that we attempt to see things from the Other's 
point of view, using her vocabulary and her way of understanding the 
world."210 The British legal system refused such an "ethics of otherness." 
The result: the expiration of the other. 
To recap. The essentially rehabilitative claim that I have advanced in this 
section is not only that law is politically manipulative, but also that law is, 
in a strong sense, culturally contingent; that it is "local knowledge, not 
placeless principle."2 1 1  The hunger strike of 1981 represents and signifies a 
collision of incommensurable legal cultures in which one - the Brehon 
tradition of the disempowered fasting against the empowered - due to its 
marginalized status, was not encoded or intelligible as such because of the 
hegemonic ascendency of the common law juridical psyche. As 
Milovanovic states in a slightly different context, "[t]wo worlds touch, but 
only one can speak the truth."2 1 2  My aim has been, through the decon­
structive supplementary logic of reversal and displacement, to rehabilitate 
this almost erased ethico-juridical other, to reconceptualize fasting as a 
practice of juridical decolonization, and to posit that the refusal of the 
British state to recognize this other legal culture is but another form of 
violence. As Young points out: 
Cultural imperialism, moreover, intersects with violence. The culturally 
imperialized may reject the dominant meanings and attempt to assert their 
own subjectivity, or the fact that their cultural difference may put the lie to 
the dominant culture's implicit claim to universality. The dissonance 
generated by such a challenge to the hegemonic cultural meanings can also 
be a source of irrational violence.213 
Perhaps this explains Thatcher's correlation of fasting with male prowess. 
C. "Beyond Incrimination":214 Fasting as a Jurisgenerative Act 
In the previous section I argued that fasting was a "jurisgenerative" act,215  
a rights claim through which the prisoners sought to go beyond incrimination, 
to posit a juridical framework for their conduct. This section develops more 
precisely the nature of the rights claim advanced by the prisoners. 
2 10 Balkin, "Transcendental Deconstruction: Transcendent Justice", supra note 24 at I 158. 
2 1 1  Supra note 181 at 2 18. 
2 I 2 Milovanovic, supra note 24 at 138. 
2 1 3  J.M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Lawrenceville: Princeton University 
Press, 1990) at 63. 
214 D. Milovanovic, "Rethinking Subjectivity in Law and Ideology: A Semiotic Perspective" 
(1992) 4 J. of Human Justice 3 I at 34. 
215 Cover, supra note 23 at 16. 
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Roberto Unger has suggested that we tend only to be able to understand 
a rights claim if it is modelled on what he has called "the consolidated 
property right."216 That is, rights are only intelligible if they are exclusivist 
in their orientation, or, as he says in one particularly poignant phrase, "a 
right is a loaded gun that the right holder may shoot at will in his comer of 
town."211 Unger argues, however, that we must break with this 
unidimensional, other-rejecting and totalizing conception of rights. In its 
place, he reconstructs a more diversified taxonomy of "market", 
"immunity", "destabilization" and "solidarity" rights. 218 Of particular 
importance to this essay is the possibility of interpreting the hunger strike 
as an invocation of either "destabilization" or "solidarity" rights.219 
Destabilization rights, in Unger' s scheme of things, are designed to 
ensure continued openness. Their aim is to guard against closure with the 
correlative dangers of the entrenchment of privilege, bureaucratic obduracy 
and the institutionalization of oppression. Destabilization rights enable the 
citizen to criticize and disturb the institutions and practices of domination 
without being subject to repression.220 _Fasting can be encoded as such a 
right. It is a claim by the oppressed that they are aggrieved and 
disempowered. By putting their lives on the line, they show their belief that 
the relations of domination and subordination are so intense that the 
continuation of life is intolerable in such a condition. 
Consider the way in which the British state sought to erase the Irish 
identity via the progressive erasure of the Irish body. Prisoners, once 
arrested, were held for lengthy periods of time, interrogated, and frequently 
abused - both physically and mentally.221 Confessions, which were usually 
involuntary, were the sole basis of conviction by jury less courts and unionist 
affiliated judges. 222 
216 R.M. Unger, False Necessity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) at 5 1 1-
513. 
217 R.M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1986) at 36. 
218 Supra note 216 at 508-539. 
219 For a further discussion of Unger's project, see R. Devlin, "On the Road to Radical 
Reform" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall LJ. 641. Some readers may find this tum to Unger 
to be most curious, given that he is often portrayed as an "archmodemist" and therefore 
profoundly at odds with the postmodernist orientation of this essay. Two points may be 
worth noting. First, as I have pointed out in footnote 40, I do not see modernism and 
postmodernism as being in absolute contradiction; rather I understand the relationship 
to be a complicated but dependent critique. Second, as will become apparent in Part V 
of this essay, I have several significant reservations about the pragmatic consequences 
of an uncritical adoption of postmodernist positions. The ensuing analysis, drawing on 
Unger, foreshadows some of these reservations. 
220 Unger, supra note 216 at 530-535. 
22 I For official accounts of these practices, see Ireland v. United Kingdom, ( I 978] 2 E.C.H.R. 
55 (Eur. Court of Human Rights); Report of Amnesty International Mission to Northern 
Ireland ( 1977); Bennett Report on Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland, 
(1979). For other, more critical, accounts see D. Faul & R. Murray, The Castlereagh File 
(1978) and P. Taylor, Beating the Terrorists? (New York: Penguin, 1980). For a prisoner's 
account, see Sands, Life, supra note 157, and Sands, Skylark, supra note I .  
222 P. Hillyard, "Political and Social Dimensions of Emergency Law in Northern Ireland", 
A. Jennings, ed., Justice Under Fire: The Abuse of Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland 
(London: Pluto Press, 1988) 191 at 200; M. Miller, "The Orange Judiciary" (1976) 40 
Hibernia Rev., 6. 
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Imprisonment meant subjugation to, and control by, the oppressor, to the 
very clothes you were entitled to wear. If you refused to wear the "badge 
of criminality" - uniforms - you were deprived of all clothing and 
subjected to frequent beatings. If you sought interaction with the outside 
world your body was subjected to penetrating searches by four prison 
guards - including rectal mirror, finger and sponge searches - and, if you 
resisted, again beatings were inflicted. When you remained steady in your 
resistance the state determined to further humiliate you. To make you feel 
even more vulnerable, you were not allowed to have two towels for the 
shower, thereby exposing you to the abuse of the guards; when you 
protested you were denied the right to shower and, indeed, the right to go 
to the washroom. Increasingly, your very body was becoming a terrain of 
political struggle. On their routine searches the guards kicked over your 
chamber pot, so that the floor and your mattress were covered in urine and 
excrement. To avoid this, you slopped out the human waste under the door 
of your cell or out the window, only to have it gratuitously returned. And 
then, you spread your excrement on the walls. You lived like this for 
several years: naked, beaten, searched and perennially punished. In such a 
context, the conventional wisdom that life and death are binary opposites 
becomes manifestly false.223 In these conditions, life is a form of death. In 
such a situation you have nothing left but your life itself with which to 
protest the state's pervasive and invasive subjugation of your body. You 
seek to destabilize such a juridical regime by reconstituting your body itself 
into a form of a legal claim: a hunger strike. Quite literally, you embody 
law_224 
Alternatively, the hunger strike could be interpreted as the assertion of a 
"solidarity right." Unger claims that the basic purpose of a solidarity right 
223 As Sands himself reflects while he was on the "dirty protest": 
But there were times when Milltown [Cemetery] would have been a preferable 
alternative when things became so unbearable that you really just couldn' t care less 
whether you lived or died just as long as you could escape the hellish nightmare. 
Aren't we dying anyway, I thought? Aren't our bodies degenerating to a standstill? 
I am a living corpse now. What will I be like in six months time? Will I even be 
alive in another year? I used to worry about that, churning it around in my mind for 
hours on end. But no more ! Because that is the only thing left they can do to me: kill 
me. I have known this for some time and God knows that it isn't for the want of 
trying that they haven't achieved that on some one of us yet ! But I am determined 
that I shall never give up. They can do what they will with me but I will never bow 
to them or allow them to criminalize me. 
Sands, life, supra note 157 at 54-55. See also, Sands, "Christmas Eve", and "And so 
Life in This Hell Goes On" in Skylark, supra note 1 at 97, 127. 
224 For further helpful discussions of how the body itself can be a terrain of political 
struggle and mode of communication see Young, supra note 213 at 87 and D. Levin, 
"The Body Politic: The Embodiment of Praxis in Foucault and Habermas" ( 1989) 9 
Praxis International 1 15. 
Foucault 's work on "the micro-physics of  power" focuses on how various state and 
quasi-state apparati seek to construct and encode the body with certain significations, a 
process which he conceptualizes as the "political economy of the body". [M. Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 1st American ed., (New York: Pantheon 
Books, I 977) at 26]. My concern is more with how the oppressed reconstitute their 
bodies to resist state repression. 
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is to "give legal form to social relations of reliance and trust."225 Due to the 
quasi-fiduciary nature of such relationships, Unger argues that the "people 
bound by solidarity rights are prevented from taking refuge in an area of 
absolute discretion within which they can remain deaf to the claims others 
make upon them."226 Whereas Unger has an unduly narrow conception of 
solidarity rights and would confine them to the ("private") realms of "the 
family", and "continuing business relationships", I would suggest the idea 
has even larger potential, particularly as a claim against ("public") 
bureaucratic power. 
To the extent that the idea of solidarity rights is based upon relations of 
dependency, it can be drawn upon as a foundation for seeking good faith 
consideration of a petitioner's claim. In Martha Minow's terms, it might be 
called the right to "equality of attention."221 The fasting prisoners exhausted 
every option. They had appealed to higher courts228 on the basis that many 
of the convictions had been dependent upon illegally obtained confessions, 
only to be turned down in the face of substantial evidence supporting their 
claims.229 They had negotiated with the government only to be mislead and 
betrayed. They had refused to wear uniforms, gone "on the blanket", on the 
"no. wash protest" and eventually, on the "dirty protest", but to no avail. 
They had exhausted all their domestic legal remedies230 and had even gone 
to the European Commission on Human Rights, only to be told that they 
were without cause.23 1 The hunger strike, drawing on the ancient tradition 
of troscead, was the ultimate claim of the dispossessed to the solidarity 
right to be heard. It forwarded a rights claim, or more specifically, a 
prisoners' rights claim. The fast was an appeal by the disempowered to the 
humanity of the empowered, which was facetiously dismissed as, at best, 
propaganda, at worst, a manifestation of gender relations. Although the 
prisoners sought to embody law, the British state rejected an "ethics of 
otherness" and refused to listen. 
Moreover, it was not only the British state that was contemptuous of such 
jurisgenerative rights claims. As the next section will demonstrate, the 
European Commission on Human Rights was equally dismissive, but 
perhaps for different reasons. To develop this analysis I will draw upon 
several deconstructive and postmodern arguments. 
D. Mandarin Antipathy 
In August 1978, during the "dirty protest", four prisoners permitted a 
Belfast lawyer and law professor (and subsequent law dean in Eire) to make 
an application on the former' s behalf to the European Commission on 
Human Rights. The basis of the claim was that the physical conditions of 
225 Supra note 2 I 6 at 535. 
226 Id. at 537. 
227 M. Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exi::lusion and American Law (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990) at 297. 
228 Beresford, supra note 3 at 242, 282. 
229 See supra note 221. 
230 McFeely, supra note 151 at 71-75. 
231 Id. For a full discussion of the Mcfeely decision, see infra Part III, D. 
